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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The Economic Leaders of APEC made a commitment to enhance and facilitate trade and 
investment flows in the region at their meeting in Seattle, November 1993 (APEC, 1993a; 
1993b). In the Bogor Declaration of November 1994 (APEC, 1994), the Economic Leaders 
made a further commitment to the goal of achieving free and open trade and investment in the 
Asia-Pacific region by the year 2020.  The industrialized members of APEC were called upon 
to remove barriers to trade and investment flows in the region by 2010 (APEC, 1994.) These 
two commitments  marked the beginning of APEC’s initiative to liberalize and facilitate trade 
and investment (TILF) in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
The second stage in the development of the TILF Initiative occurred at the 1995 meeting of 
the Economic Leaders in Osaka, at which the Osaka Action Agenda was brought fo rth as the 
first step in implementing the Bogor Declaration (APEC, 1995).  The Osaka Action Agenda 
(OAA) called upon APEC to develop action plans both on an individual member and on a 
collective basis, in fifteen specific areas.  The first two of these areas were: Tariffs and Non-
Tariff Measures (NTMs) (APEC, 1994).  
 
The Early Voluntary Sector Liberalization (EVSL) program has its roots in the proposed 
Collective Actions in the Tariff and NTM areas that appears in the OAA. It resulted from an 
effort to: 
 
“identify industries in which the progressive reduction of tariffs may have a positive 
impact on trade and on economic growth in the region or for which there is regional 
industry support for early liberalization” (APEC, 1994). 
 
Stage three in the TILF Initiative emerged at the 1996 Economic Leaders’ meeting in Manila.  
At the meeting, the Manila Action Plan for APEC (MAPA) was introduced.  MAPA built 
upon the Osaka Action Agenda by outlining the trade and investment liberalization measures 
to be implemented in pursuit of the goals laid down by the Bogor Declaration.  MAPA 
brought together the individual economy plans, the collective action plans, and joint activities 
on economic and technical cooperation (APEC, 1996a). 
 
At the Manila meeting in 1996, the Economic Leaders did, moreover, explicitly call upon 
their ministers to identify candidate sectors for Early Voluntary Liberalization (APEC, 
1996b).  The following year in Vancouver, the Economic Leaders endorsed fifteen sectors 
that had been selected for liberalization under EVSL (APEC, 1997a). For nine fast-track 
sectors, trade liberalization agreements were to be finalized for the approval of Trade 
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Ministers and Leaders at the November 1998 APEC meetings in Malaysia. 
 
One of the fast-track sectors is fish and fish products. This study was commissioned to 
examine the economic impact of eliminating tariffs on fish and fish products in APEC 
economies. Chapter II provides a qualitative assessment of the impacts of liberalization of 
fisheries trade drawing on the available data and economic theory. Chapter III presents 
specific quantitative estimates of the impact on trade flows of fish and fish products using an 
econometrically estimated model of fisheries trade liberalization. Chapter IV summarizes the 
study’s overall conclusions. 
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II. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This section presents an overview of the growth of world trade in fisheries products, and the 
role of APEC in this trade, followed by a review of the state of world fishery resources and an 
assessment of the probable shifts in comparative advantage in fisheries trade.  It then 
examines the basic underlying theory of the impact of tariffs and their removal, as applied to 
fisheries. 
 
It commences, however, with a commentary on the impact upon trade flows in fisheries of the 
fishery resources themselves.  The commentary is divided into two parts, the first being rather 
obvious, the second less so.   
 
Somewhat similar to forestry and agriculture, the fishery resources of the APEC region 
consist of a myriad of species which vary by regional and climatic zones.  Consequently, it is 
to be expected that two way trade in fisheries products among APEC members will be 
commonplace.  Thus a temperate zone APEC member could be expected to be exporting 
products arising from temperate zone species, for example, pollock, salmon, while at the 
same time importing products arising from tropical zone species, for example: skipjack tuna. 
 
Secondly, trade in fisheries products will be affected by constraints on supply and resource 
management practices.  World fisheries can be divided into two broad categories, aquaculture 
and capture fisheries.  In terms of volume of output, the division is roughly 15-20 per cent 
aquaculture; 80-85 per cent capture fisheries (FAO, 1997(a)).  In aquaculture, or "fish 
farming", one would anticipate that supply of output can, as in agriculture or forestry, be 
increased through time by devoting more resources to aquaculture and through improvements 
in productivity. 
 
In capture fisheries, by way of contrast, nature will place an ultimate upper limit on 
sustainable harvests from the resources, even if the resources are superbly managed.  There is 
evidence, which will be noted  below, that the upper limit is clearly in sight. 
In addition, capture fishery resources are characterized by management problems, not 
normally encountered in aquaculture, which can be expected to have an impact upon trade.  
Capture fishery resources within, and without, the APEC region have proven over time to be 
notoriously difficult to manage with full effectiveness in both economic and biological terms.  
The source of the difficulty lies in the fact that, due to the mobility of most fish, and the fact 
that fish are not readily visible prior to capture, it had in the past proven difficult to establish 
effective property rights to the resources.  Ill-defined, or simply non-existent, property rights 
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result in the emergence of a set of perverse incentives confronting fishers, which leads in turn 
to the twin evils of over-exploitation of the resources and overcapitalization in both the 
harvesting and processing sectors (Munro, Bingham and Pikitch, 1998). 
 
Resource management will obviously influence trade by having an impact upon the 
sustainable supplies of harvested fish emanating from capture fisheries. In addition, however, 
there is, as is being increasingly recognized, an interaction between resource management 
and international trade in fisheries (PECC, 1997).  As shall be discussed at a later point, 
ineffective resource management can have a negative impact upon international trade.  On the 
other hand, effective resource management and liberal international trade are mutually 
supportive. 
 
THE ROLE OF APEC IN WORLD FISHERIES PRODUCTION AND TRADE 
 
It is no exaggeration to state that the APEC members combined dominate world production 
of harvested fish.  Over the most recent five year period for which complete data is available, 
1991-1995, total world production of fish averaged just under 105 million metric tonnes.  The 
twenty-one APEC members combined accounted for approximately 68 per cent of the total 
(on average) over the five year period (FAO, 1995; 1997b). 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the annual fish production flows of the APEC members averaged over the 
period 1991-1995. 
 
Six APEC members, Canada, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, 
and the United States have significant fish harvesting operations in the Atlantic.  Two APEC 
members, Malaysia and Thailand, harvest fish in the Indian Ocean.  If the APEC harvests in 
the Atlantic and Indian Oceans are excluded, the APEC member harvests in the Pacific are 
found to account for approximately 60 per cent of the world total production (FAO, 1995; 
1997b). 
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The Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N. (FAO) divides world harvest of fish into 
five broad species categories.  The relative importance of the five categories to world 
harvests, in volume terms, and APEC's share in each of the categories, is shown in Table 1. 
The APEC shares are based on total  APEC harvests1: 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1: WORLD HARVESTS* OF FISH BY SPECIES CATEGORIES – 
1991–1995 (PERCENTAGES) 
Species Category  Percentage of Total  
World Harvests 
Percentage of Harvests 
 Accounted for by APEC 
Freshwater: 
     Finfish 
     Shellfish 
 
14.37 
0.60 
 
 
64.23 
93.55 
Total Freshwater 15.07 65.38 
                                                                 
1 That is to say, including harvests by APEC members in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 
FIGURE 1: FISHERIES PRODUCTION BY APEC MEMBERS 
1991-1995*
*Average production over this period
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Marine: 
     Groundfish 
     Pelagics 
     Shellfish 
 
16.80 
54.30 
13.83 
 
57.30 
69.64 
78.71 
Total Marine 84.93 68.69 
   
Grand Total 100.00  68.19 
   
* In volume terms   
Source: FAO, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, selected issues 
 
 
Another classification of world harvests of fish, employed by FAO and one which is 
becoming increasingly important through time, divides world harvests of fish between those 
arising from aquaculture and those arising from capture fisheries, both marine and freshwater.  
The percentage division of world harvests, for the period 1991–1995, on an aquaculture– 
capture fishery basis is shown in Table 2: 
 
The dominance of APEC in harvests of aquaculture produced fish (in volume terms) is 
particularly striking.  While aquaculture as a share of total world harvests (in volume terms) 
is modest, aquiculture harvests have been growing rapidly.  As will be emphasized later, 
aquiculture is expected by the FAO to account for a large share of any future increases in 
world harvests of fish.  
  
TABLE 2: WORLD HARVESTS* OF FISH, 1991-1995  
AQUACULTURE VS. CAPTURE FISHERIES 
Source of  
Harvests 
Percentage of Total World 
 Harvests 
Percentage of Harvests  
Accounted for by APEC 
Aquaculture    16.09 78.06 
Capture Fisheries    83.91  66.30 
Grand Total 100.00 68.19 
* Volume 
Source: FAO, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics, selected issues 
 
Of the APEC producers of aquaculture fish, one economy is dominant - China, as is apparent 
in Figure 2, which shows the breakdown between aquaculture and capture fishery production 
of APEC members.  Indeed, over the period 1991-1995, China alone accounted for 50 per 
cent of the world aquaculture production (in volume terms (FAO, 1997b). 
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In turning now to world trade in fishery products, it is found that the FAO provides an 
estimate of the volume of harvested fish entering into international trade.  Since 1980, the 
volume of harvested fish entering into trade has steadily trended upward from 30-35 per cent 
of total production to 40-45 per cent.  Consider Figure 3. 
 
FIGURE 3: WORLD HARVEST AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE IN COMMERCIAL FISHERIES 1980-1995
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Anderson (1997) and others have argued that the upward trend reflects, to some degree, the 
impact of the United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) regime.  As a consequence of the advent of the EEZ regime, major 
FIGURE 2: CAPTURE FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE 
PRODUCTION BY APEC MEMBERS 1991-1995*
*Average production over this period
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distant water fishing nations have found their access to fisheries restricted and have had to 
rely more heavily upon international markets for supplies of fishery products. 
 
World trade in fish products in value terms approached U.S. $56 billion in 1995 (FAO, 
1997b).  The APEC members' share of the trade (in volume terms) is approximately 55 per 
cent of exports and 58 per cent of imports (FAO, ibid.)  Not surprisingly, the APEC members 
are seen to dominate world trade in, as well as world production of, fishery products. 
 
What is also not surprising is the fact that much of the fisheries product trade of APEC 
members is intra-APEC region trade.  It is estimated that over 85 per cent of APEC member 
exports of fishery products are destined for other APEC economies.  It is estimated further 
that 65 per cent of APEC member imports of fishery products are supplied by other APEC 
members (Graham, Klijn, Cox, Stokes and Hartman, 1998). 
  
Figures 4 and 5 show annual fish import and export flows (in value terms) averaged over the 
1991-1995 period.  Figure 4 is particularly striking.  Two import nations, Japan and the 
United States, are of almost overwhelming importance.  Japan and the United States are not  
just leading fish importers within APEC.  They have for many years been consistently the 
two leading fish importing nations for the world at large (FAO, 1997b).  Over the 1991-1995 
period, Japan alone accounted for in excess of 30 per cent of the world's imports of fish and 
fish products (in value terms).  Japan and the United States combined accounted for almost 
44 per cent of fish/fish products imports during that period (FAO, ibid.). 
 
FIGURE 4: IMPORTS OF FISHERIES PRODUCTS BY APEC 
MEMBERS 1991-1995*
*Average imports over this period
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The APEC pattern for exports is not as heavily dominated by a few economies, as is the 
import pattern.  It is worth noting, however, that the two leading APEC export nations, 
Thailand and the United States alone lead the world (FAO, ibid.). 
 
FIGURE 5: EXPORTS OF FISHERIES PRODUCTS 
BY APEC MEMBERS 1991-1995*
*Average exports over this period
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It was observed above that, given the wide diversity of fish species, one could anticipate that  
many APEC members could be expected to have extensive two way trade flows in fishery 
products.  The two way flows could be expected to have policy implications.  A net fish 
importing nation having significant export flows of fishery products could be expected to be 
less resistant to a reduction of trade barriers.  The temporary adjustment difficulties to be 
encountered on the import side would likely be offset, in part, by the immediate gains on the 
export side. 
 
Hence, it is appropriate, and of value, to obtain a measure of the two way trade flows in 
fishery products of the APEC members.  There is, in fact, a simple measure of such two way 
trade flows commonly used by economists studying sectoral trade issues.2 
Denote exports (in value terms, per period of time) as X.  Denote imports (in value terms, per 
period of time) as  M, and denote the Net Export Ratio as NXR: 
 
NXR=(X-M)/(X+M) 
                                                                 
2See for example: Australian Pacific Economic Cooperation Committee (1997a; 1997b). 
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The NXR can clearly vary from +1.0 to -1.0.  At either extreme, trade is strictly one way.  If, 
for example, NXR = +1.0, the economy exports fishery products and imports nothing.  By 
way of contrast, if NXR = 0, then we would have a case of perfect two way trade.  The 
economy's exports of fish would prove to be equally balanced by imports. 
 
Figure 6 presents the fisheries sector NXRs for the APEC members, based, once again, on the 
1991-1995 period.  There is a wide range.  While Japan does have significant exports in 
absolute terms, they are overwhelmed by its imports.  The economy approaches the pure net 
importer extreme.  The United States, on the other hand, might be classified as a "moderate" 
net importer.  The American NXR indicates that its fishery export flows are significant in 
relative, as well as absolute, terms.  Finally, a set of developing APEC members, for example 
Viet Nam and Peru, are close to being pure net exporters of fish.  
 
In summary, the APEC members combined clearly play a dominant role in world 
fisheries,both in terms of production and of international trade.  It follows, therefore, that 
changes in APEC fisheries trade policy, for example the elimination of tariffs, could be 
expected to have a profound impact on world trade in fisheries at large. 
 
It is now time to examine the state of world fishery resources, with particular attention to 
those of the Pacific.  This examination will lead to a consideration of the prospects for future 
increases in the level of world harvests and the likely shifts in comparative advantage among 
Pacific fish producers. 
FIGURE 6: APEC FISHERIES SECTOR 
NET EXPORT RATIOS 1991-1995*
*Average net export ratio over this period
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THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERY RESOURCES 
 
The examination commences with capture fishery resources which do, at the present time, 
provide the basis for approximately 80-85 per cent of the world's fish production.  It will be  
recalled that capture fishery resources are characterized by the fact  that the sustainable level 
of harvests from the resources faces an upper bound imposed by nature and by the fact that 
the inherent difficulties in managing the resources militate  against the upper bound ever 
being achieved in practice. 
 
The most thorough assessment of capture fishery resources is provided by the FAO in various 
publications.  The single most authoritative FAO sponsored document on capture fisheries is 
the paper prepared by Serge M. Garcia and Christopher Newton in 1995 (Garcia and Newton, 
1995).  The paper is in fact concerned almost exclusively with marine capture fisheries.  
Those fisheries account for approximately 90 per cent of total capture fishery harvests. 
 
Garcia and Newton's starting point is a 1971 FAO volume edited by John Gulland (Gulland, 
1971).  In this volume, it is estimated that the theoretical maximum sustainable world 
harvests from capture fishery resources is 100 million tonnes per annum, with the practical 
maximum being in the order of 80 million tonnes. 3 
 
Figure 7, taken from the Garcia/Newton paper, presents an historical trend of marine capture 
fishery harvests from the early 19th century.  Growth in world harvests began to accelerate 
before World War II, and then grew rapidly from about 1950 onwards.  Garcia and Newton  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
3 In 1971, the harvest was of the order of 65 million tonnes. 
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FIGURE 7: 
GROWTH OF WORLD HARVEST OF FISH: MARINE FISHERIES 1800 – 1990 
 
Source: Garcia and Newton, 1995 
 
 
speculated that the Gulland maximum4  was close to being achieved and stated that "after a 
long history of fisheries growth, all ava ilable data point to the conclusion that the total 
potential of traditional species has been reached ... " (Garcia and Newton, 1995, p. 24). 
 
Garcia and Newton did much more, however, than argue that the Gulland ceiling may have 
been achieved.  They warned that, in fact, many fishery resources were being subject to 
serious overexploitation, particularly the high valued species, for example the major demersal 
species.  The basic management problem confronting capture species was clearly manifesting 
itself. 
 
                                                                 
4 As shall be seen, estimates of the global maximum were to be revised after the appearance 
of the Garcia and Newton paper. 
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Garcia and Newton categorized fishery resources as "underdeveloped," "developing," 
"mature" and "senescent".  Mature fishery resources were defined as those which are being 
harvested at the maximum average long term yield, while senescent fishery resources were 
defined as those fishery resources exploited beyond that limit.  Undeveloped fishery 
resources represented resources whose rate of harvest growth was accelerating, while 
developing fishery resources were those whose rate of increase of harvest growth was 
positive, but decelerating. 
 
Figure 8 is taken from a post-Garcia/Newton FAO document (FAO, 1997c), which shows the 
state of marine fishery resources plotted against time within a Garcia and Newton framework. 
 
Significant undeveloped fishery resources have long since disappeared.  Fully 60 per cent of 
the marine fishery resources are now seen to be "mature" or "senescent" (FAO, 1997c).  Of 
the 60 per cent, 25 per cent represent "mature" resources.  Garcia and Newton concede that 
"mature," or "fully fished" resources are not overexploited.  They continue, however, that in 
light of the state of world fisheries management, the "mature" fishery resources are prime 
candidates for the "senescent" category in the not distant future (Garcia and Newton, 1995, p. 
13). 
 
Garcia and Newton continue by pointing out that the fishing pressure has not been evenly 
spread over species.  As one would expect, the “senescent” category is crowded with 
relatively high valued species, such as several temperate zone groundfish species, along with 
crustaceans, such as lobster and prawn/shrimps.  The pattern is, again as one would expect, 
that of initial heavy exploitation of high valued species, followed by the exploitation of 
successively less valued species (Garcia and Newton, ibid.).  Thus, the aforementioned 60 per 
cent figure does, if anything, understate the over-exploitation of marine capture fishery 
resources in economic terms. 
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FIGURE 8: 
PERCENTAGE OF MAJOR MARINE FISH RESOURCES IN VARIOUS PHASES 
OF FISHERY DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
   Source: FAO, 1997(c) 
 
FAO publications, appearing after the Garcia and Newton paper, do allow for the possibility  
that the Gulland ceiling was somewhat conservative (see for example: FAO, 1997b, 1997c).  
The FAO place the current average annual harvest from marine capture fisheries at a level of 
80-85 million tones (FAO, ibid.).  The FAO estimates that sustainable marine capture fishery 
harvests could approach 100 million tonnes per annum, if there were significant 
improvements in fisheries management (including reduction of both discards and post harvest 
waste) (FAO, ibid.).  Over the much longer term - and hence well beyond the time horizon of 
this study - there could be additional increases due to exploitation of less than fully utilized 
resources - e.g. the Indian Ocean.  The FAO also warns, however, that, if improvements in 
resource management are not forthcoming, and if the optimism pertaining to hitherto less 
than fully utilized stocks proves to be unwarranted, the current level of harvests could in fact 
prove to be unsustainable, i.e. futureharvests could decline (FAO, ibid.).  More about these 
assessments later. 
 
In addition to its global assessment, the FAO also provides ocean by ocean assessment of 
marine fishery resources (FAO, 1997c).  The Atlantic Ocean, as a whole, for example, is seen 
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to have achieved, and then gone beyond, its capacity by the mid 1980s.  The Pacific Ocean, 
as a whole, is seen to be on the verge of achieving its maximum harvests by 1999 (FAO, 
1997c, p. 8). 
 
The foregoing assessments of the Pacific (and of the Atlantic) are very broad averages.  In the 
immense area of the Pacific, for example, there are sub-areas in which the capture fishery 
resources show clear signs of overexploitation, while there are sub-areas in which there still is 
some scope for the growth of harvests.  It is, therefore, necessary to examine the sub-areas of 
relevance to APEC in somewhat greater detail.  In so doing, the  focus will be on the 
sub-areas of the Pacific which, by definition, are central to APEC, followed by a 
consideration of  what might be referred to as areas of ancillary importance to APEC, such as 
the Indian Ocean. 
 
The following table shows the FAO's estimate of annual landings by Pacific sub-area on the 
basis of five year (1990-1994) average, and shows as well the FAO's assessment when the 
sub-area's potential was, or will be, achieved.  The assessment was based on the optimistic 
assumption that improvements in resource managements are possible.5   
 
The Northwest Pacific (FAO Statistical Area 61) covers a sub-area which ranges from the 
border of China and Viet Nam through Chinese Taipei, Korea, Japan, Northwest Russia to 
the western reaches of the Bering Sea.  Two species have dominated the harvests of the 
sub-area,  namely Japanese pilchard (or sardine) and the immense Alaska pollock stocks.  
Alaska pollock provides an example of the world groundfish stocks which Garcia and 
Newton maintain have typically been subject to excess exploitation (Garcia and Newton, 
1995).  The FAO declares Alaska pollock in the Northwest Pacific to be fully overexploited, 
and predic ts a steady decline in harvests (FAO, 1997c, p. 77).  The Japanese pilchard, which 
are subject to substantial fluctuations, are, from the FAO perspective, difficult to assess.  In 
any event, the FAO sees the sub-area achieving its potential in 1998. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
5 The FAO’s assessments are also based on total marine fishery resources, including mari-
culture resources, which may moderately bias the assessments in some cases. 
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TABLE 3: AVERAGE ANNUAL LANDINGS, MARINE CAPTURE FISHERIES 
SUB-REGIONS OF THE PACIFIC, 1990-1994, AND YEAR IN WHICH SUB-
REGIONAL POTENTIAL EXPECTED TO BE ACHIEVED 
 
Sub-Region 
of the Pacific 
 
Average Annual 
 Landings 
(millions of mt) 
Percentage of Total Year in Which Sub- 
Region Potential 
 Expected to be 
 Achieved 
Northwest  21   42.9  1998 
Northeast  3   6.1  1990 
East Central  1   2.0  1988 
Southeast  15   30.6  2001 
Southwest  1   2.0  1991 
West Central  8   16.3  2003 
Total  49   100.0   
Source: FAO, 1997(c), Table A2.1, Tables X–XV. 
 
 
The companion region of the Northeast Pacific (FAO Statistical Area 67) extending from the 
Eastern Bering Sea to Northern California, has Alaska pollock and the set of Pacific salmon 
species as its most important fishery resources in economic terms.  Both resources are, at best, 
deemed by the FAO to be "fully utilized."  On an overall basis, the FAO categorizes this 
sub-region as overfished  (FAO, 1997c), and having achieved its full potential at the turn of 
the decade. 
Of the East-Central Pacific (FAO Statistical Area 77) extending from Southern California to 
Northern Colombia, little needs to be said except that the FAO places the sub-region firmly in 
the overfished category, and states that it achieved its potential before the turn of the current 
decade. 
 
A more interesting sub-region, by way of contrast, is the Southeast Pacific (FAO Statistical 
Area 87) extending from mid-Colombia to beyond the southern tip of South America.  In 
terms of volume of marine harvests, this currently ranks as the second most important 
sub-region of the Pacific. 
 
Historically, this region has been dominated by small pelagics, such as Peruvian anchoveta 
and Chilean sardines, although large pelagics, such as Chilean jack mackerel and some 
demersals are taking on a larger role.  The small pelagics have been subject to violent 
fluctuations, due primarily to environmental factors. The history of the Peruvian anchoveta is 
too well known to merit repeating. 
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The FAO estimates that the region could, conceivably, almost double its production.  The 
FAO is quick to add, however, that these estimates are very uncertain (FAO, ibid., p. 9). 
 
The West Central Pacific (FAO Statistical Area 77) includes Southeast Asia and most of the 
Pacific Island Nations Region. It ranks third in volume terms and probably higher in value 
terms, given the importance of tuna harvests in the region. 
 
Many of the marine fisheries in Southeast Asia exhibit signs of overfishing.  On the other 
hand, the industrial tuna fisheries, skipjack in particular, could, under careful management, 
sustain a one-third increase in harvests (FAO, ibid. p. 108). 
 
Finally, the Southwest Pacific (FAO Statistical Area 81) comprises New Zealand and Eastern 
Australia.  While both economies have introduced interesting and encouraging resource 
management techniques, the FAO sees no scope for increased harvests from the region and 
declares it to have long since achieved its potential. 
Overall, there are only two sub-regions that appear to have the potential for significant 
increases in harvests from marine capture fisheries, the Southeast Pacific and the West Central 
Pacific.  The potential increases are, however, uncertain at best. 
 
Of the ancillary areas relevant to APEC, one could list the North Atlantic, the Southwest, the 
Southeast and West Central Atlantic, and the Eastern Indian Ocean.  With regards to the 
Atlantic sub-areas, all, except the Southwest Atlantic, are deemed to be overfished. 
 
The East Indian Ocean is one area in which the FAO foresees the possibility of a substantial 
expansion of capture fishery harvests.  The projection, as well as being highly uncertain, is 
very long run, far beyond the time horizon of this report.  The FAO estimates that, if its 
optimistic projection were justified, it could take the East Indian Ocean forty years to achieve 
its potential (FAO, ibid.). 
 
Aquaculture is an area in which the role of APEC is particularly dominant.6   The FAO refers 
to aquaculture as one of the fastest growing food production activities in the world (FAO, 
1997a).  Over the decade 1985-1995, aquaculture production of fish grew, in volume terms, at 
an average annual rate of 10.7 per cent (FAO, ibid.).  One of the great advantages which 
aquaculture has over capture fisheries is the absence of the problems associated with ill-
defined property rights to the resource, and  the management difficulties to which they 
inevitably give rise. 
                                                                 
6 See Table 2. 
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To bring together the discussion on capture fisheries and aquaculture, it is useful to focus on 
the FAO's fishery supply projections to the year 2010.  The FAO offers pessimistic and 
optimistic scenarios, which are presented in Table 4, along with the actual average annual 
production for the period 1991-1995: 
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TABLE 4: SUPPLIES OF FISH FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION AND 
REDUCTION (MILLIONS MT) 
 Average Projected Production 2010 
Source of Production  Annual 
Production 
 1991–1995 
Pessimistic 
Scenario 
Optimistic 
 Scenario 
Aquaculture 17  27  39 
Capture Fisheries 
  (Freshwater and   
          Marine) 
87 
 
     80*   105 
Total 104  107  144 
    
Source: FAO, 1997(a); Yearbook of Fishery Statistics (selected issues). 
 
*The FAO has assumed that, if capture fisheries management does not 
improve, capture fisheries harvests may decline.  
 
The optimistic scenario shows an increase of supply of 40 million tonnes up to the year 2010.  
The increase is divided evenly between aquaculture and capture fisheries.  A few comments 
are in order. 
 
Under the optimistic scenario, aquaculture production is projected to grow at an average 
annual rate of approximately 5 per cent.  The projection is optimistic, but it is not wildly so, 
given the recent history of aquaculture.  It will be recalled that world aquaculture production 
grew at an average annual rate of just below 11 per cent during the decade 1985-1995. 
 
The projected increase in capture fishery harvests in the optimistic scenario is based upon the 
effects of improved management.  In light of the severe difficulties that have been encountered 
in the management of capture fishery resources, we deem the projection to be exceedingly 
optimistic.  There are a few economies, such as New Zealand, which apparently have achieved 
considerable success.  These, however, are the exceptions.  Indeed, it is noteworthy that the 
FAO, in its pessimistic scenario, allows for a modest growth in aquaculture harvests, but 
assumes a decline in capture fishery harvests. 
 
In 1995, the last year for which complete data is available, aquaculture, in volume terms, 
accounted for less than 20 per cent of world production of fish.  Nonetheless, it is our 
judgement that the bulk of any increase in sustainable harvests of fish will likely be 
concentrated in the aquaculture sector. 7 
                                                                 
7 All this is not to deny that these are problems associated with aquiculture.  Suitable 
aquaculture sites are not unlimited. Aquaculture production units, if poorly managed, can lead 
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With regards to projected demand for fish and fish products, this will depend upon population 
growth, per capita income growth and upon changes in relative prices.  As we shall note at a 
later point, evidence we have suggests that the income elasticity of the demand for fish is high; 
but own price elasticity is moderately low.  The FAO's estimates, which appear to be based on 
the assumption of constant relative prices, is that the increase in demand by 2010 would equal 
the increase in supply under the FAO optimistic scenario, i.e. the demand would increase to 
140-150 million tonnes per annum (FAO, 1997a). 
 
SHIFTS IN COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
 
The basic theory, underlying the determination of the pattern of trade, is the theory of 
comparative advantage, which dates back to the early 19th century.  The theory postulates 
that, under conditions of free trade, a given economy will concentrate in the production  of 
those goods and services in which its relative, or comparative, ability to produce is greatest.  
The economy will then export those goods and services in which it has a comparative 
advantage and import those in which it has a comparative disadvantage.  The pattern of trade, 
thus dictated by comparative advantage, is not static, but can, rather, be expected to shift 
through time. 
 
As a next step, one needs to explain the factors underlying comparative advantage.  The most 
widely accepted theory of the factors underlying comparative advantage is that propounded by 
two 20th century Swedish economists, Eli Heckscher and Nobel Laureate Bertil Ohlin (see 
Krugman and Obstfeld 1994; Lindert, 1986; or any other standard text in international 
economics).  Put in its simplest form, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory notes that economies 
(regions) vary in terms of their relative abundance of inputs.  The theory continues that 
economies will be revealed to have a comparative advantage in products that use their 
abundant inputs, or factors of production, intensively, and a comparative disadvantage in 
products which use their scarce inputs intensively. 8 ii) A 
product is labour- intensive, if labour costs are a greater share of its value than they are of the 
value of other products. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
to the degradation of the surrounding environment. In principle, however these problems are 
not distinct in nature from those encountered by agriculture, or other terrestrial industries. 
8 A succinct definition of input/factor of production abundance and an equally succinct 
definition of input/factor of production intensity have been provided by Lindert (1986, p.31). 
These are: 
 i) A economy is labour abundant if it has a higher ratio of labour to other inputs than 
does the rest of the world. 
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The Heckscher-Ohlin theory has reasonably good predictive powers, but in applying it one 
often needs to disaggregate the inputs extensively and to add various other qualifications.  One 
important qualification, dealt with in a rigorous manner by Paul Armington (1969), rests upon 
the fact that, in many industries, products within a common product category, but having 
different geographical origins, are imperfect substitutes for one another.  Thus, for example, 
textiles produced in Japan may be perceived by buyers as not being identical to textiles 
produced in, say, the Philippines.  Consequently, intra- industry, or two way, trade can and 
does emerge.  Thus, for example, Japan might be found to be both an exporter, and an 
importer of textiles.  The APEC Economic Committee, in its study of the impact of trade 
liberalization in the APEC region, notes that such two way trade accounts for an important 
share of trade in the region (APEC, 1997b). 
 
In the case of fisheries, considerable disaggregation of inputs would be required.  Thus, for 
example, climatic conditions - temperate vs. tropical - would have to be considered as a form 
of input.  Furthermore, qualifications not normally found in other product areas would have to 
be introduced.  For example, since fleets are mobile, we would have to consider, in assessing 
the fishery resource abundance or scarcity of a economy, the ocean space legally open to the 
economy's fleets.  Fishery resources open for exploitation by the economy's distant water 
fleets, as well as the fishery resources within the economy's home waters, would have to be 
taken into account. 
 
An Armington type of effect is also readily observable in the industry.  Fish within broad 
species categories are imperfect substitutes for one another.  No one would suggest that 
temperate zone bluefin tuna is a perfect substitute for tropical zone skipjack tuna.  We have 
already emphasized the fact that two-way trade in fisheries products is to be expected in 
APEC, and is readily observable. 
 
Figure 6, showing the Net Export Ratios for the APEC members, might be thought of as 
providing a first, and admittedly crude, approximation of an overview of comparative 
advantage in APEC regional fisheries.  One is not surprised to find that the Net Export Ratio 
of Japan is close to -0.9.  Japan's extensive imports of primary products is often cited by 
textbooks in international economics as an example of the predictive power of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory - Japan has a relative scarcity of natural resources (see for example: 
Lindert, 1986, p. 34).  Conversely, one is not surprised to find a economy, such as Peru, with a 
large positive net export ratio. 
 
Assessments of how comparative advantage has shifted in the recent past, or how it is likely to 
 
22 
shift in the future, are necessarily highly speculative.  Nonetheless, we can at least offer some 
comments, the first of which is based on the paper by Garcia and Newton (1995).  The authors 
note that the advent of the EEZ regime in the late 1970s-early 1980s administered a shock to 
the pattern of fisheries comparative advantage/disadvantage.  Distant water fishing nations 
found their access to fishery resources outside of the nations' home waters restricted.  Coastal 
states found their control over fishery resources off their coasts substantially increased.9  
 
As an example of the impact of the advent of the EEZ regime, Garcia and Newton cite the 
example of Japan and the United States.  The Net Export Ratios of the two were much closer 
before the advent of Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, than after (Garcia and Newton,1995.).  
Indeed, one finds, based on an average of the years 1980-1982, immediately prior to the close 
of the U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, that the American net export ratio was 
equal to -0.46, while that of Japan was equal to -0.62.  Over the ensuing decade and a half, the 
American net export ratio was to rise to -0.32, while the Japanese net export ratio fell to -0.90. 
 
The authors also argue on the basis of observation, that there appears to be  a worldwide shift 
in fisheries comparative advantage towards developing fishing nations.  The authors do not 
offer any reasons for this shift (Garcia and Newton, 1995.). 
 
Other, but by no means contradictory, shifts in comparative advantage have been detected by 
James Anderson, an academic economist who has done extensive work in trade in fisheries 
products.  Anderson argues that there is evidence that the growth in trade in fisheries products 
has favoured fisheries not suffering the effects of ill-defined property rights, which affect so 
many capture fisheries.  These would include effectively managed capture fisheries and 
aquaculture operations (Anderson, 1997).  Thus, those fishing nations with minimal 
aquaculture operations, and with capture fisheries that are not effectively managed, could, 
other things being equal, expect to find that their comparative advantage in fisheries 
production is diminishing. 
 
Note that the Anderson arguments are consistent with our observation that future growth in 
world harvests, within the next 10 to 15 years is likely to come primarily from aquaculture.  
The arguments are also, by no means inconsistent with the Garcia and Newton assertion that 
comparative advantage in fisheries is tending to shift in favour of developing economies.  If 
we examine the APEC aquaculture harvests (by volume), it is found that a preponderance - in 
excess of 80 per cent - was accounted for by developing members. 10 
                                                                 
9 Every distant water fishing nation is also a coastal state, so there will be some offsetting 
influences. 
10 Admittedly this outcome is heavily influenced by one developing member, China. 
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THE IMPACT OF TARIFFS UPON TRADE AND WELFARE: THE THEORY 
 
Basic economic analysis is required to predict the likely consequences of a region wide 
elimination of tariffs on trade in fishery products within APEC.   The analysis has as its 
foundation the standard theory of tariffs to be found in any text on international economics 
(for example, Lindert, 1986).  The foundation is not, however, sufficient unto itself.  To it 
must be added, where appropriate, the economics of fisheries management. 
 
After completing the discussion on tariffs, it is necessary to consider the impacts of non-tariff 
measures on trade in fisheries products.  While this project is focussed on tariffs, non-tariff 
measures can not be totally ignored. 
 
The central argument against the use of tariffs, or any barriers to trade, for that matter, is that 
their use will have the effect of distorting the pattern of trade as dictated by comparative 
advantage.  The distortions will, in turn, result in various inefficiencies through the 
mis-allocation of productive resources and through the imposition of welfare losses upon 
consumers.  Having said this, economists do concede that certain groups within the economy 
imposing the tariffs do gain thereby.  The implication, of course, is that, if a economy which 
had introduced tariffs in the past decides to eliminate them, there will be groups within the 
economy which will lose as a result, and that there may be painful adjustments to be endured. 
 
Prior to turning to the analysis of the impact of tariffs and their removal, it is necessary to 
address some definitional matters and to gain a broad overview of tariffs on fishery products 
in the APEC region.  First, tariffs are normally defined as specific or ad valorem in nature, that 
is to say they are either expressed as a fixed tax per unit of the imported good (or service), or 
they are expressed as a percentage of the landed value of the relevant good or service.  The 
majority of fishery product tariffs in the APEC region are expressed on an ad valorem basis 
(Graham et al., 1998).  In the following analysis, all APEC tariffs on fishery products are 
expressed as ad valorem tariffs. 
 
Table 5 presents the average overall ad valorem tariffs on fishery products for the APEC 
members.  The source of the tariff data was the APEC Fisheries Working Group survey of 
tariffs (APEC, 1997c).  Furthermore, the average tariff rates quoted are those that will be 
found to be used in the quantitative assessment of the removal of fishery product tariffs in the 
APEC region. 
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATED AVERAGE TARIFF 
RATES ON FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS: APEC 
MEMBERS 
APEC Member Average Tariff 
Rate (%) 
Australia   0.13 
Brunei Darussalam   0.00 
Canada   1.37 
Chile  
 11.00 
China  
 25.18 
Hong Kong   0.00 
Indonesia   4.37 
Japan   6.47 
Republic of Korea  
 15.55 
Malaysia   4.62 
Mexico  
 15.00 
New Zealand   2.78 
Papua New Guinea  
 49.12 
Peru  
 15.00 
Philippines  
 10.93 
Singapore   0.00
  
Chinese Taipei  
 17.75 
Thailand  
 51.20 
United States of America   1.22 
Russia  
 12.87 
Vietnam  
 13.69 
 
Source: APEC Working Group on Fisheries (1997c) 
Survey of Tariffs on Fish and Fish Products. 
 
The average tariff rates display a wide dispersion over the APEC members.  We can note that 
the tariff rates for the two members which dominate APEC fish-related imports (Japan and the 
United States) are moderate.  Nonetheless, in comparison with other industry groups in the 
APEC, tariffs on fishery products tend to be high (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, 
1995).  To take but one example, one normally thinks of agriculture as a sector subject to 
 
25 
substantial protection.  Yet, within the APEC region, tariffs on fisheries products are (on 
average) approximately 15 per cent higher than are tariffs on agricultural products (PECC, 
1995). 
 
Furthermore, the average tariff rates, as presented in Table 5, understate the true degree of 
protection which they offer, probably by a significant margin.  As is true in many industries, 
the tariff rates escalate with the level of processing (Graham et al., 1998). This fact calls upon 
us to acknowledge the distinction between nominal rates of protection and effective rates of 
protection provided by tariffs. Economists argue that the true measure of protection offered an 
import competing industry by its economy's tariff structure is the extent to which the tariff 
structure enhances the value added of the firms in the industry.  Value added is the total value 
of an industry's output, minus the cost of inputs purchased from other industries. 
 
Formally, the Effective Rate of Protection (ERP) provided to an industry by the economy's 
tariff structure can be expressed as follows (Lindert, 1986): 
 
ERP=(v’-v)/v 
  
where v is the  industry's valued added per unit of output under free trade, and where v’  is the 
value added per unit of output under the existing tariff structure. 
 
To illustrate, consider the following example.  An industry is engaged in canning one species 
of fish for sale in the domestic market.  Under conditions of free trade, firms in the industry 
would receive a price of U.S. $500 per case.  The cost of raw fish required to produce one case 
is, under free trade, U.S. $300.  Suppose further that the raw fish is imported, and suppose 
finally that this is the only input purchased by the canning industry from other industries.  
Thus under free trade, the value added per case is U.S. $200. 
 
Now suppose that the authorities impose a 20 per cent tariff on canned fish of this species, 
which enables the producers in the industry to sell their product domestically for U.S. $600.  
No tariff is imposed on raw fish.  Value added per case will now rise to U.S. $300.  The 
nominal rate of protection is 20 per cent.  The true Effective Rate of Protection is, however, 
actually 50 per cent. 
 
Suppose, alternatively, that the authorities accompany the 20 per cent tariff on canned 
products with a 20 per cent tariff on raw fish.  The canning industry would then enjoy an ERP 
of 20 per cent, which is to say that the nominal and effective rates of protection would be 
identical. 
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Now return to the observation that, in the APEC region, tariff rates on fishery products 
escalate with the level of processing.  From this, it can safely be concluded that the higher the 
level of processing in the import competing fishing industries in the region, the greater is the 
gap between the nominal and effective rates of protection provide by tariff barriers. 
 
The standard approach to the theory of tariffs in international economics is to focus on the 
impact of introducing tariffs within a given economy.  From this, one can readily infer the 
benefits to be gained, and the adjustments to be endured, by removing tariffs imposed in the 
past. 
 
In presenting the theory, it is necessary to employ some supply and demand analysis.  An 
attempt will be made, however, to keep the complexity of the analysis to a minimum and to 
use a level of analysis that one might find in, say, The Economist.   
 
The starting point, once again, is that tariffs distort the pattern of trade dictated by comparative 
advantage.  From a worldwide standpoint this will, except in unusual circumstances, lead to a 
misallocation of resources and a resultant loss in world welfare.  Economists would concede, 
however, that, under special circumstances, an individual economy may gain by imposing 
tariffs, which implies, in turn, that the economy would benefit at the expense of its trading 
partners. 
 
It is anticipated that, within the economy imposing tariffs: 
 
 1) the domestic industries competing with imports will gain; 
 2) the government will gain additional tax revenue from the tariff; 
3) the consumers will experience a decline in “welfare.”  That is to say, the amount of 
benefit/satisfaction which the consumers will enjoy from the consumption of goods 
and services, given their limited income, will decline.  The point will be developed 
more fully, when we introduce the economist’s concept of “Consumer Surplus.” 
 
 
The usual assumption which is used, rightly or wrongly, is that a given change, which results 
in the consumers' losing the equivalent of $100 in welfare, and the domestic industries and 
government each gaining $50, implies a net gain/loss for the economy as a whole of $0 (see, 
for example: Lindert, 1986). 
 
Since the issue in question is the removal of tariffs in a single sector, what economists refer to 
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as partial equilibrium analysis can be used, as opposed to the far more complex general 
equilibrium analysis that would have to be used if one was examining the removal of all tariffs 
within a economy.  At a later point, however, comments about general equilibrium 
considerations will be provided. 
 
To use even the simpler partial equilibrium analysis, it is necessary to review certain key 
concepts, namely: A) import demand and export supply; and B) consumer surplus and 
producer surplus. 
 
A) Import Demand and Export Supply 
 
The key point to be made here is that a economy's import demand function for a product is 
derived from the economy's overall demand for the product and the economy's domestic 
supply of the product.  Consider Figure 9, in which no tariffs are assumed to exist. 
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Suppose that the world price of the product (adjusted for transportation costs) was $100.  The 
economy would import nothing.  On the other hand, if the world price was $50, the total 
quantity demanded within the economy would be 100 units, while the quantity supplied  
domestically would be 10, leaving the gap of 90 to be filled by imports.   
 
A economy's import demand with respect to a given product is thus more price elastic, that is 
to say more price sensitive, than the economy's overall demand for the product.  If the price of 
the imported product rises, less will be imported, both because the consumers will wish to 
consume less of the product, and because the domestic suppliers will be encouraged to 
produce more.  
 
For completeness sake, an export supply function for an exporting economy is illustrated in   
Figure 10.  Similar to an import demand function, an export economy's export supply function 
is derived from total domestic supply and domestic demand for the product.  The export 
supply function is more price elastic than the overall domestic supply function.  If the price of 
the export product rises, the economy will export a greater quantity, both because of increased 
output within the economy and because the economy's consumers will consume less. 
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B) Consumer Surplus and Producer Surplus 
 
These admittedly rather esoteric concepts are necessary for an understanding of the economic 
impact of the imposition, or removal, of a tariff.  "Consumer Surplus" is a measure of the 
value to consumers of a produc t which they purchased over and above the amount consumers 
have paid for the product.  The corresponding concept of "Producer Surplus" is a measure of 
the revenue received by producers from the sale of a product in excess of the cost of 
production.  Consider Figure 11 (a) and (b) which involves the purchase and sale of 100 units 
of a product at a price of $50. 
 
The benefit to consumers of acquiring 100 units per period of time is represented by the area 
under the demand curve at 100 units.  Part of the bene fit is offset by the cost to the consumers 
($50 x 100), but not all.  Return to Figure 9.  The diagram indicates, for example, that the 
consumers would have been prepared to pay $100 for the 20th unit.  If the price is $50, they 
will only have to pay $50 for that 20th unit – hence there is a “surplus” to be enjoyed by the 
consumers on that unit.  In fact, the diagram reveals that the consumers would have been 
prepared to pay more than $50 for each of the first 99 units – indeed much more than $50 for 
the first few units.  In Figure 11(a), the total “Consumer Surplus” is represented by the shaded 
area   With regards to Producers Surplus, the cost to the producers of supplying 100 units is 
represented by the area under the supply curve at 100 units.  This is less than the total receipts 
of the producers ($50 x 100).  The difference, represented by the shaded area in Figure 11(b), 
is Producer Surplus. 
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With these basic concepts in mind, let us now consider the impact of the imposition of a tariff 
on a particular product by one economy, assuming that one economy is too small to have any 
significant impact upon the world price of the product.  Suppose that the world price of the 
product is $50 and that the authorities introduce a 20 per cent ad valorem tariff (that is to say, 
a tariff of $10) on the product.  Consider now Figure 12. 
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In this example, the tariff raises the domestic price from $50 to $60.  The domestic consumers 
lose, with Consumer Surplus being reduced by the area acdh in Figure 12(a).  This loss in 
consumer welfare is offset in part by the gain of the domestic industry which is competing 
with the imports.  The increase in Producer Surplus is represented by the area abgh in the 
same figure.  There is a further offset through increased government tariff revenue ($10 x 78), 
represented by the area bcef. 
 
The offset is incomplete, however.  Consider the triangles  cde  and bfg, which together 
constitute what economists refer to as Deadweight Loss.  This represents the “net” loss to the 
overall economy of the importing economy caused by the distortions created by the 
introduction of the tariff.  
 
The area cde is referred to as the Consumption Effect and reflects the fact that consumers are 
driven to consume less of the product.  The area bfg, referred to as the Production Effect, 
reflects the additional, and unnecessary, production, or acquisition, cost to society of the 
product.   
 
In Figure 12(b), the Deadweight Loss, shown by cde (Consumption Effect) and bfg 
(Production Effect) in Figure 12(a), is consolidated.  It is shown as the shaded area under the 
Import Demand Function.  Generally speaking (with some qualification), the more price 
elastic is the import demand function, the greater will be the combined Consumption and 
Production effects of the tariff, and hence the greater will be the Deadweight Loss.  If, for 
example, the import demand function was perfectly price inelastic – domestic demand for, and 
production of, the good were completely insensitive to price changes – the import demand 
function would be represented by a vertical straight line.  The Deadweight Loss would be 
zero. 
 
There are several qualifications which must now be added.  First, if the product in question 
plays a major role in the economy, the "partial equilibrium" analysis used here is likely to be 
inadequate.  Some of the intersectoral consequence of the imposition of the tariff would not be 
captured by the analysis.  It would then be necessary to turn to a general equilibrium analysis, 
such as was used by the APEC Economic Committee in its analysis of trade liberalization in 
general in the region (APEC, 1997). 
 
On the other side of the ledger, the examples developed so far are those of an economy which 
is too small to have an impact on the world price of the product.  If the economy is large 
enough to affect the world price of the relevant product, then the so called “terms of trade” 
effect will become relevant.  A country’s terms of trade can, in broad general terms, be 
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thought of as the number of units of imports that a country can obtain per unit of exports (see, 
for example, Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994).  If the world prices of the goods and services 
which a country imports fall, while the world prices of the country’s export goods and services 
remain constant, then the country’s terms of trade would be said to have improved.  If indeed 
the economy is large enough to affect the world price of the relevant product, then one of the 
impacts of the tariff will be to force down the world price of the product, because total world 
demand for the product would fall as a consequence of the tariff.  Other things being equal, the 
country’s terms of trade would improve thereby.  This “terms of trade” effect of the tariff 
would produce a further offsetting benefit for the importing economy.  The additional benefit 
would obviously come at the expense of the exporting economies. 
 
This leads to a major qualification of the analysis that has been presented so far.  All of the 
analysis has been in terms of single economies.  But the issue at point concerns the fisheries 
tariff policy of APEC members as a group.  Consequently, while it is reasonable to suppose 
that for most APEC members the "terms of trade" effect of changes in their  tariffs on fish and 
fish products would be weak, one could expect that the “terms of trade” effect of  a change in 
tariff policy of the APEC members combined would be substantial given APEC’s dominant 
position in world fisheries.  In fact, however, in Chapter III of this report it will be argued that, 
while there will probably be a short run “terms of trade” effect, the long run “terms of trade” 
effect of an APEC-wide removal of fisheries tariffs is likely to be negligible because of the 
availability of adequate increased supply from aquaculture at constant costs to meet the 
relatively small increase in demand. 
 
The question of the impact of tariff removals can now be addressed in a straightforward 
manner.  Everything goes into reverse.  Within the importing economies that are removing 
tariffs, the consumers will clearly benefit.  The industries competing with the imports would 
face contraction, with the surviving firms presumably becoming more efficient.  The 
government would lose revenue.  The key point, however, is that the gain to the consumers 
could be expected to outweigh the losses to domestic producers and the government.  The net 
gains to these importing economies could, it is true, be mitigated by the "terms of trade" effect, 
if the latter was significant. 
 
Since the “terms of trade” effect for the APEC region as a whole could be significant, albeit 
only in the short run, it is necessary to comment  on the impact upon the exporting economies 
of a tariff-policy- induced increase in the price of their products.  While the diagrammatic 
analysis done for importing economies is not repeated for exporting economies, it would 
indeed be the case that the consumers in the exporting economy would experience a loss in 
consumer surplus.  It can be easily demonstrated, however, that this loss would be more than 
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offset by the gain in producer surplus. 
 
This report is concerned with the impact of the removal of tariffs on fisheries produc ts.  
Nonetheless, it is necessary to comment as well on non-tariff measures and their impact upon 
trade flows.  If tariffs are removed, but then simply replaced by non-tariff measures (NTMs), 
trade flows could end up by being more distorted than they were before. 
 
In 1994, the PECC Task Force on Fisheries Development and Cooperation completed a survey 
of fishery NTMs.  The survey was then published in the journal INFOFISH International, in 
1995 (Munro, 1995).  The following table shows the major NTMs employed by APEC 
members as reported in the aforementioned survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS NON-TARIFF MEASURES  
EMPLOYED BY APEC MEMBERS 1995 
______________________________________________________________________ 
1. Import Quotas for Selected Species 
2. Ban on Imports of Selected Species Excepted for Specific End Uses 
3. Health and Sanitary Regulations 
4. Requirement of Exceptionally Rigorous Documentation by Importing Firms 
5. Ban on Imports of Certain Species from Certain Export Economies on Grounds that the 
Latter are Engaged in Unacceptable Conservation Practices. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Munro, 1995. 
 
It can be remarked in passing that it is often difficult to identify those NTMs which are truly 
trade distorting.  Consider Item 3. 
 
The key point to be made about NTMs, that act as trade barriers, is that over time they have 
the potential to produce greater distortions to trade than do tariffs.  It is common in textbooks 
on international economics to demonstrate that tariffs and non-tariff barriers can have 
equivalent effects.  The claim is not incorrect, but it is misleading, because it is based upon 
strictly static analysis. 
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Consider Figure 13 which shows a particular economy's import demand for a particular 
product.  It is assumed that the economy faces a perfectly elastic foreign export supply.  Let 
Wp  be the world price and let W'p be the world price plus the tariff: W'p= Wp(1+t), where t is 
the ad valorem tariff rate.  When the import demand is Import Demand I, a quantity OM is 
imported.  The same result could be achieved by imposing a NTM in the form of an import 
quota of OM per period.  With the quota, the price within the economy would rise to W'p. 
 
 
Now, however, suppose that the import demand shifts out to Import Demand II.  With the 
tariff, the quantity imported would increase to ON.  With an import quota, on the other hand, 
the quantity imported remains the same and the price within the economy simply rises to W"p. 
Similarly, if the foreign export supply shifted outwards due to, say, a decrease in foreign  
production costs, the consumers in the importing economy would, under a tariff regime, enjoy 
a portion of the benefits from the cost reduction and imports would increase.  With an import 
quota in place, the consumers would enjoy none of the cost reduction benefits and the level of 
imports would remain unchanged. 
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What has been discussed to this point is what might be referred to as the "classical" theory of 
tariff and NTM policy.  This discussion must be supplemented with two other considerations, 
one of which is common to trade policy in general, and one of which is peculiar to the 
fisheries.  The first concerns the problem of adjustment in the import competing industry when 
faced by a removal of trade barriers.  The second concerns the problem of resource 
management and the interaction between such management and trade policy. 
 
With regards to adjustment in the import competing industry, the simple diagrammatic 
analysis which has been used, suggests that, when tariffs are removed and the import 
competing industry contracts, productive resources will flow smoothly and easily out of the 
importing competing industry to be used elsewhere in the economy with greater efficiency.  
This view of the world does, in fact, overlook the fact that some of the conventional capital 
and some of the "human capital" employed in the industry may be use specific.  To use some 
jargon taken from the economics of fisheries management, it could be said that such 
conventional and “human” capital lacked “malleability,” by which we mean flexibility or 
adaptability. 
 
Where the capital in the contracting import competing industry is non-malleable, then one 
cannot deny that a difficult, and likely painful, adjustment problem will  have to be 
confronted, requiring specific government programs, such as retraining.  To say, however, that 
the adjustment is difficult is not an argument for continued restrictive trade policy.  To accept 
such an argument would be to revert to the protectionist mistakes of earlier times and to 
impose a permanent burden on the economy. 
 
It can be conjectured that, among the net fish importing members of APEC, the degree of the 
adjustment problem may be influenced by the size of the member's net export ratio.  If the 
member is a "moderate" net importer, with a net export ratio greater than  -0.5 (say -0.2, for 
example), then the contraction in the import competing segments of the fishing industry will 
be accompanied by an expansion in the export oriented components of the industry.  It may 
thus be possible for some of the required adjustment to take place on an intra-industry basis, 
which will probably prove to be easier than adjustments which have to take place on an inter 
industry basis. 
 
The second issue of resource management and its interrelationship with trade in fisheries is a 
more complex one.  There is now an increasing recognition of such an interrelationship 
(PECC, 1997).  The interrelationship is seen to occur on two levels with the first being the 
impact of trade policy upon resource management. 
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In order to understand the impact of trade policy upon resource management, we must first 
digress to explore in somewhat greater detail, the basic economic problem associated with 
many capture fisheries.  At an earlier point in the report, it was argued that, historically, many 
capture fisheries have been characterized by an absence of effective property rights to the 
resource.  This “common property” (or ”common pool”) characteristic, the argument 
continued, leads to an overexpansion of the fishery and an overexploitation of the resource.  
The problem is illustrated in Figure 14, which is to be found throughout the fisheries 
economics literature (see, for example, Munro and Scott, 1985). 
 
In Figure 14, it is assumed that the price of harvested fish and the unit cost of fishing effort are 
both constant, and that the fishery is a “pure open access,” one, in which there are no effective 
property rights to the resource, and in which there is no effective government regulation of the 
fishery. 
 
Consider Curve I, which represents the initial sustainable revenue (gross) from harvesting.  
Each point on the curve is determined by the sustainable harvest associated with a given level 
of fishing effort, multiplied by the initial price for harvested fish, which we shall denote as  pI.  
The straight line TCE represents the total cost of fishing effort. 
 
If the rate at which future economic returns from the fishery are discounted is equal to zero, 
 Figure 14
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then it can be argued (see Munro and Scott, 1985) that, on economic grounds, the fishery 
should, from society’s point of view, be stabilized at a level of fishing effort OA, at which the 
sustainable net economic benefits (resource rent) from the fishery will be maximized.  Under 
conditions of open-access, however, the fishery will expand to a level of fishing effort OC, at 
which the resource rent is fully dissipated, and which is commonly referred to, in the 
economics literature, as Bionomic Equilibrium (Munro and Scott, 1985).  Thus, the argument 
continues, conditions of open access lead to an excessive expansion of the fishery, and hence 
an overexploitation of the resource. 
 
Now consider the effect of an increase in the price of harvested fish from pI to pII, pII > pI .  
The sustainable revenue curve will appear to shift outwards to  Curve II.  The consequence 
will be that the level of fishing effort will expand to OD, thus aggravating the problem of 
overexploitation.  Conversely, if commencing at price pI, the price of harvested fish falls to pIII 
< pI, the sustainable revenue curve will shift inwards to Curve III.  Bionomic Equilibrium will 
now be at OB.  Thus the problem of resource overexploitation will have been mitigated. 
 
Now let us apply this analysis to the impact of trade policy upon resource conservation.  If a 
net fish importing nation is plagued with over-exploited fishery resources, then we can 
anticipate the following.  A reduction in tariffs on imported fish products will reduce the price 
received for harvested fish by domestic fishers. This, in turn, will result in a contraction of the 
domestic fisheries, and thus a mitigation of the resource overexploitation encountered in these 
fisheries. 
 
It should also follow, however, that if the fisheries in the net export economies are 
ineffectively managed, the reduction in tariffs could aggravate the resource conservation 
problem in these economies.  If the reduction in tariffs has a “terms of trade” effect, which 
raises the price of harvested fish to the net exporters, then the result would be intensified over-
exploitation of the resources.  Thus, the case could be made that, under such circumstances, 
free trade in fisheries could prove to be non-optimal from a resource conservation perspective 
(see, for example: Brander and Scott, 1998).  There is a threefold response to this proposition. 
 
Ineffective economic management of fishery resources is often characterized as an example of 
market failure.  There does, in fact, exist a whole set of arguments against free trade based 
upon perceived market failure.  The argument against free trade in fisheries can thus be 
considered as one of the set. 
 
The general counterargument to the market failure arguments for protection is that it is far 
better, far more efficient, to attack the market failure directly, rather than indirectly by creating 
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trade distortions (Krugman and Obsfeldt, 1994).  Thus, in the case of fisheries, it is far more 
sensible to attack the problem of ineffective resource management directly.  As the PECC 
Fisheries Task Force Symposium on the Interrelationship between Fisheries Management 
Practices and International Trade emphasized in its report, free trade and sound fishery 
management are not in conflict.  On the contrary, they serve to complement one another 
(PECC, 1997). 
 
The second element of the response is that a review of the development of fisheries trade 
reveals that comparative advantage is shifting in the direction of well managed fisheries.  
While aquaculture has been emphasized, this applies equally well to a well-managed capture 
fisheries.  The move towards freer trade in fisheries, and the resultant unfettering of 
comparative advantage, should enhance APEC  wide attempts to improve the management of 
fishery resources. 
 
The third element of the response is to note that, while there may be a short run “terms of trade 
effect” to an APEC wide removal of fisheries related tariffs, the long run “terms of trade 
effect” is likely to be negligible because of the availability of increased supply from 
aquiculture, a constant returns to scale industry.  Thus, any possible negative impact of tariff 
reduction on resource conservation in net export economies would, at most, be transitory. 
 
The second level at which the interrelationship between resource management and trade 
management manifests itself involves the impact of resource management upon trade, rather 
than the other way around.  This second manifestation is perhaps the more serious of the two. 
 
The PECC Fisheries Task Force symposium concluded that there was a case to be made for 
the claim that "bad resource management leads to bad trade" (PECC, 1997).  There is 
increasing evidence that the perception of ineffective resource management will give 
encouragement to those in net fish importing economies who wish to see the introduction of 
non-tariff measures, ostensibly for conservation purposes.  The supposed purpose of the 
measure is to "compel" the net exporting economies to improve their resource management.  
The measures are trade barriers, nonetheless. 
 
Moves towards eco- labelling sponsored by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide 
an important example (PECC, 1997).  Eco- labelling programs, if successful, will lead to price 
differentials, with unlabelled products fetching lower prices.  Thus, the program will have the 
same effect as a discriminatory tax.  Moreover, the programs can, in some instances, go much 
farther and lead to de facto boycotts of the unlabelled products by the private sector, or 
governments, which could, in turn, have a devastating effect on certain export oriented fishing 
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industries.  Consequently, the threat remains that, moves towards freer trade through the 
removal of tariffs, could be undermined by the spread of NTMs, imposed in the name of 
improved resource management. 
 
The appropriate conclusion is not that attempts to reduce barriers to trade in fish and fish 
products are futile.  It is rather that trade issues in fisheries must not be addressed in isolation 
from resource management issues.  To repeat an earlier comment, free trade in fish and fish 
products, and sound resource management do not stand in opposition to one another.  Rather 
they are complements, which should prove to be mutually re-enforcing. 
 
SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
 
The following chapter, Chapter III, will present a quantitative assessment of the removal of 
tariffs on fish and fish products in the APEC region.  The final conclusions of the report must 
obviously follow that assessment.  Nonetheless, we can, at this stage offer some preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
The first conclusion is that the APEC region dominates both world fisheries production and 
trade.  Thus, fisheries trade policy changes introduced within APEC must be expected to have 
a profound effect upon the world at large. 
 
The second conclusion is that the growth in world fisheries production and in the volume of 
trade will come primarily from aquaculture, and, possibly to some extent, from improved 
management of capture fishery resources.  Comparative advantage is shifting away from fish 
producing nations with ineffectively managed fishery resources. 
 
A third conclusion is that the long run terms of trade effect of a removal of tariffs on fish and 
fish products can be expected to be negligible because of the availability of increased supply 
from aquiculture at constant costs of production.  From our second and third conclusions, it 
follows that the argument to the effect that the removal of tariffs would aggravate resource 
management problems in APEC net fish exporting members appears to have little merit.  On 
the contrary, the unfettering of comparative advantage can be expected to promote, rather than 
hinder, the move towards better managed fisheries in the APEC region. 
 
The removal of the APEC tariffs on fish and fish products would obviously benefit the net 
exporting members of APEC.  Given the absence of a long run terms of trade effect of the 
removal of tariffs, our analysis indicates that net importing members should also benefit 
overall from the improved efficiencies brought about by freer trade.  There would, of course, 
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be adjustments within these economies that would have to be addressed. 
 
It is evident that the removal of tariffs on fish and fish products would produce benefits which 
would be spread throughout the APEC region.  Nonetheless, a cloud remains on the horizon.  
Tariffs are but one component of trade barriers.  The benefits arising from the removal of 
tariffs could easily be undermined by the spread of NTMs.  Particularly dangerous are those 
NTMs imposed in the name of improved resource management. 
 
The appropriate response to this threat is to recognize that it is inappropriate to regard trade 
policy in fisheries and resource management in isolation from one another.  Ineffective 
resource management can serve to undermine the move towards freer trade; improved 
resource management will strengthen that move.  Freer trade, in its turn, will serve to 
maximize the benefits to the region of improved resource management.  
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III. QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES 
 
THE FISHERIES TRADE LIBERALIZATION MODEL 
 
To provide specific quantitative estimates of the impact on trade flows of the elimination of 
tariffs on fish and fish products, a model of fisheries trade was constructed (see Appendix B).  
This model uses the price elasticities estimated from import equations for fish and fish 
products (see Appendix A) to calculate the increase in fisheries imports. This is based on the 
plausible assumption that consumers will react to price decreases resulting from tariff 
reductions in the same way as they would to any other price decrease.  In other words, the 
estimated price elasticities from the import equations are also assumed to apply to price 
reductions to the consumer resulting from the elimination of fisheries tariffs. Besides the tariff 
levels and price elasticities, the other important factor determining the impact is the level of 
imports of fish and fish products in the 1995 base year.  
 
The increase in fisheries exports in the model required to meet the increase in import demand 
is assumed to be spread among the world’s economies based on their 1995 market share of 
global exports. This simple assumption is reasonable and is justified by the impossibility of 
estimating supply functions for fisheries exports due to data limitations. The estimates of the 
increase in imports and exports produced by this model are long-run equilibrium results and 
do not show the time profile of the response resulting from the phase out of fisheries tariffs 
over a multi-year period.  The estimates also assume that sufficient supply will be forthcoming 
at the existing price to meet the required increase in exports. This assumption is relatively 
reasonable given that aquaculture is expected to be the dominant source of the increased 
production of fish and fish products and aquaculture is an industry that can be expected to 
have constant returns to scale. 
 
THE ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF ELIMINATING FISHERIES TARIFFS 
 
The average tariffs to be eliminated are shown by category of import in Table 7 for all of the 
APEC member economies. The overall average tariff rates for the member economies are 
shown in Figure 15. All other things being equal, the economies with the highest tariff rates in 
a specific category are expected to have the largest impact from tariff elimination. The 
economies with the highest tariffs are: Thailand (51.20 percent); Papua New Guinea (49.12 
per cent); China (25.18 per cent); and Chinese Tapei (17.75 percent).  Tariff rates on oils and 
meals are lower than for other categories. Tariffs on crustaceans and molluscs are slightly 
higher on average than on fish, and tariffs on canned fish products are a little higher still. 
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The summary results for imports and exports by economy of removing APEC tariffs on fish 
and fish products are provided in Table 8. Figure 16 portrays graphically  the impact on the 
value of imports.  Detailed results by product category for the volume and value of imports 
and exports are provided in Tables 9-12. Note that these are long-term equilibrium results 
assuming that tariffs are completely eliminated at a point in time. They could also be 
interpreted as the long-term equilibrium results associated with any desired pattern of phased 
reductions.  
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FIGURE 16: IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON THE VALUE OF APEC 
FISHERIES IMPORTS 
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The overall increase in APEC fisheries imports is 619 thousand metric tons or $1.6 billion 
(Table 8). This represents 5.9 per cent of APEC fisheries imports by volume and 4.8 percent 
by value. An increase of this size, representing by volume a little more than half of one year’s 
increase in world imports and a little more than two-thirds of one year’s increase in APEC 
imports, spread over the multi-year adjustment period can probably be accommodated without 
putting significant upward pressure on fish prices. Japan is the economy that will experience 
the largest share of the increase in imports by value: 178 thousand metric tons or 29 percent of 
the total APEC increase by volume and $965 million or 60.2 percent of the total APEC 
increase by value. Thailand will experience an increase in volume of imports that is 70 per 
cent of that in Japan, but a much smaller increase of $114 million in value. Other economies 
experiencing large increases in the value of imports are: Korea ($125 million);the United 
States ($112 million); Chinese Taipei ($65 million); and China $59 million.  Economies that 
will experience lesser increases in exports are: Russia ($29 million); Mexico ($26 million) the 
Philippines ($20 million); Hong Kong, China ($18 million); Canada ($15 million); Singapore 
($13 million); Chile ($13 million); Papua New Guinea ($11 million); Malaysia ($10 million); 
Indonesia ($6 million); New Zealand ($2.4 million); Vietnam ($0.5 million); Peru ($0.4 
million); and Australia ($0.3 million).  
 
The increase in imports is influenced by the current magnitude of the import market, and by 
the current level of tariffs. The increase in imports in Japan is high even though tariffs are low 
because of its very high level of imports, whereas the increase in imports in Thailand is high 
because of its high tariff levels. 
 
The increase in imports will be supplied by an increase in the volume of exports of APEC and 
non-APEC members. The export volume increase for APEC members of 303 thousand metric 
tons, and the export value increase for APEC members of $789 million each account for 49 
per cent of the total world increase. This represents an increase of 2.6 per cent in the volume 
of exports of APEC members and of 2.7 percent by value. Overall net exports in value of the 
APEC region (defined as the value of APEC exports minus the value of APEC imports) will 
fall by $816 million and net exports of the rest of the world will rise by the same amount. 
The APEC economies that will experience the largest increases in the value of exports are: 
Thailand ($122 million); the Russian Federation ($93 million); the United States ($83 
million); China ($81 million); Chinese Taipei ($68 million)  (Table 8).  Other economies that 
will experience large increases are: Indonesia ($46 million); Canada ($42 million); Korea ($41 
million); and New Zealand ($31 million). Of these economies experiencing large increases in 
exports, economies that will experience significant increases in the value of net exports 
(exports minus imports) are: Russia ($64 million); Indonesia ($40 million); New Zealand ($29 
million); Canada ($26 million); China ($22 million); Chile ($19 million); Peru ($17 million); 
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Malaysia ($15 million); Vietnam ($13 million); and Thailand ($9 million);. Other APEC 
economies that will experience small increases in the value of net exports are: Australia; 
Brunei Darussalam; Hong Kong, China;  Chinese Taipei; and Singapore. APEC economies 
that will experience increases in imports in excess of exports are: most notably Japan(-$946 
million); then Korea (-$84 million); the United States (-$28 million); Papua New Guinea (-$11 
million); the Philippines ( -$8 million); and  Mexico (-$7.4 million). 
 
Among the detailed categories of fisheries imports (Tables 9 and 10), the largest increases will 
occur for fish, fresh, chilled or frozen (386 thousand metric tons or $819 million)  followed 
by: crustaceans and molluscs (74 thousand metric tons or $447 million); crustaceans and 
molluscs, canned (28 thousand tons or $182 million); fish, canned (43 thousand metric tons or 
$99 million); and fish dried, salted or smoked (15 thousand metric tons or $21 million); meals 
(46 thousand tonnes or $23 million); and oils (28 thousand metric tons or $13 million). The 
high value products are crustaceans and molluscs and fish, fresh, chilled or frozen. Oils and 
particularly meals are low value products where the increase in tonnage is high relative to the 
value. Most of the increase in value for Japan, Thailand, China, Korea, and the Philippines, the 
economies experiencing the largest increase in imports, come from increases in fish, fresh, 
chilled or frozen and from crustaceans and molluscs. 
 
The largest portion of APEC’s increase in exports will come from increases in: fish, fresh, 
chilled or frozen (176 thousand tons or $373 million); crustaceans and molluscs (39 thousand 
tons or $237 million); and fish, canned (20 thousand tons or $46 million) (Tables 11 and 12). 
 
A COMMENTARY ON THE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Pivotal to the quantitative analysis of the impact of the removal of tariffs on fish and fish 
imports are the (own) price elasticities of the relevant import demand functions.  The (own) 
price elasticity coefficient of a demand function is the percentage change in quantity 
demanded for a product divided by the percentage change in price for the same product.  In 
absolute terms (that is to say, ignoring plus and minus signs) a coefficient greater than 1.0 
denotes a price elastic demand function, and a coefficient less than 1.0 denotes a price 
inelastic demand function. 
 
A good place to start out in judging the veracity of the quantitative estimates is with the price 
elasticity of the overall domestic demand for fish in the APEC members.  If there are 
differences, or absence of differences, between these price elasticities and the estimated price 
elasticities of the import demand functions, which the theory cannot explain, then clearly a 
problem exits. 
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Detailed estimates of demand function for fish and fish products of APEC members are not 
readily available, except for Japan and the United States, the two APEC members which 
dominate fish/fish product imports in the APEC region. 
 
The results for both Japan (Eales, Durham and Wessells, 1997) and for the United States 
(Wellman, 1992) are remarkably similar.  The demand for fish products in Japan is moderately 
(own) price inelastic, with the price elasticity coefficients (in absolute terms) varying 
according to fish product category from a low of 0.24 to a high of 0.66 (Eales, et al., ibid.).  
The results from the quantitative analysis of the impact of fisheries tariffs in the APEC region, 
indicate that the import demand (all species) price elasticities for Japan and the United States 
are moderately higher than those for overall domestic demand for fish products in the two 
economies.  The estimated import demand price elasticities are 0.74 for Japan and 0.78 for the 
United States.  This is precisely what the economic theory would lead us to expect.  It will be 
recalled from Chapter II that the import demand function is derived from the domestic demand 
and domestic supply functions of the relevant product (see Figure 9).  At a given price, the 
quantity of imports demanded will be equal to the difference between the total quantity 
demanded domestically and the total quantity supplied domestically.  If the price falls the 
quantity of imports demanded can be expected to increase, both because of the increase in the 
quantity demanded domestically, and because of the decline in the quantity supplied 
domestically.  Consequently, one should expect the elasticity of the import demand to be 
higher than that of the overall domestic demand for the product.  This is a reason to be 
confident in the empirical results. 
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TABLE 7: AVERAGE APEC FISHERIES TARIFF BY CATEGORY 
 Categories 
 Fish, 
Fresh, 
Chilled 
or 
Frozen 
Fish, 
Dried, 
Salted  
or 
Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs  
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.56  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.13 
BD  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   0.00 
CDA 0.09 0.28 1.11 4.30 2.41 3.78 1.13 1.37 
CHL  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  11.00  
PRC 30.63 51.29 33.41  45.00  45.00  30.00  11.50 25.18 
HKC  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
INA 21.18 15.48 22.33 24.32  25.00  10.00  0.00 4.37 
JPN 4.86 11.51 7.21 9.54 8.64  4.10  0.00 6.47 
ROK 14.26  20.00 19.29  20.00  20.00  3.00  5.00 15.55 
MAS  0.00 12.69 9.12 19.58  17.50 6.67  0.00 4.62 
MEX 19.39  20.00 18.46  20.00  20.00  8.00  15.00 15.00 
NZ  0.00  0.00 1.93 2.93 3.72  3.80  9.50 2.78 
PNG 54.35  55.00  55.00 50.22  55.00  11.00  11.00 49.12 
PRU  15.00  15.00  15.00  15.00  15.00  15.00  15.00  15.00 
RP 16.78  30.00 24.55 26.67  22.00  10.00  3.00 10.93 
SIN  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
CT 26.57 29.48 33.75 29.64  29.13 6.67  0.00 17.75 
THA  60.00  60.00  60.00  30.00  30.00  10.00  6.00 51.20 
USA 0.80 1.94 0.70 5.03 3.09 2.10  0.00 1.22 
RUS  10.00  17.00  10.00  23.00  28.00  15.00  5.00 12.87 
VTN 26.67  20.00 16.67  40.00  25.00  7.00  5.00 13.69 
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TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF THE IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON 
APEC FISHERIES TRADE 
 Increase in 
Fisheries 
Imports  
(metric tons) 
Increase in 
Fisheries 
Imports 
(1000 US $) 
Increase in 
Fisheries 
Exports  
(metric tons) 
Increase in 
Fisheries 
Exports 
(1000 US $) 
Change in  
Net Fisheries 
Exports 
(1000 US $) 
AUS 92 329 1,924 8,722 8,393 
BD 0 0 5 13 13 
CDA 4,567 15,191 13,411 41,576  26,384 
CHL 4,894 13,050 24,766 32,091 19,041 
PRC 79,385 59,240 21,568 81,453 22,214 
HKC 6,919 18,059 6,919 20,066 2,007 
INA 4,650 5,674 16,068 45,968 40,294 
JPN 178,104 965,095 7,422  19,055 (946,039) 
ROK 51,884 124,961 12,922 41,040 (83,921) 
MAS 5,379 9,658 5,705 24,403 14,745 
MEX 25,067 26,473 5,185 19,100 (7,372) 
NZ 2,344 2,426 9,786 31,200 28,774 
PNG 7,769 11,033 113 353 (10,680) 
PRU 450 383 26,854 17,067 16,683 
RP 35,985 19,949 3,702 11,952 (7,998) 
SIN 5,077 13,133 5,077 14,592 1,459 
CT 16,876 64,795 28,955 67,853 3,058 
THA 124,837 113,770 33,029 122,369 8,599 
USA 28,209 111,539 34,786 83,068 (28,471) 
RUS 35,706 28,871 42,013  93,277 64,406 
VTN 394 478 2,476 13,017 12,539 
APEC 
TOTAL 
618,590 1,604,108 302,685 788,234 (815,874) 
ROW   315,905 815,874 815,874 
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TABLE 9: IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON APEC FISHERIES 
IMPORT VOLUMES BY CATEGORY (METRIC TONS) 
 Categories 
 Fish, 
Fresh, 
Chilled 
or Frozen 
Fish, Dried, 
Salted  
or Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and 
Mulluscs 
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS 0 0 0 92 0 0 0 92 
BD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CDA 445 130 1,098 1,793 229 696 176 4,567 
CHL 809 4 55 3,735 2 287 2 4,894 
PRC 41,834 4,311 1,389 555 702 560 30,034 79,385 
HKC 4,585 236 1,185 489 250 48 126 6,919 
INA 1,990 3 1,164 100 51 1,340 0 4,650 
JPN 127,518 105 35,021 901 11,292 3,268 0 178,104 
ROK 35,358 276 7,761 138 6,927 1,039 387 51,884 
MAS 0 965 879 2,748 664 123 0 5,379 
MEX 1,403 49 685 2,209 1,145 18,363 1,211 25,067 
NZ 0 0 70 162 31 13 2,068 2,344 
PNG 635 0 0 6,986 0 0 148 7,769 
PRU 365 3 0 2 2 0 78 450 
RP 31,025 8 1,996 512 1,419 83 943 35,985 
SIN 3,907 49 736 71 245 3 66 5,077 
CT 3,008 62 10,851 448 1,780 728 0 16,876 
THA 104,724 934 9,695 63 1,171 937 7,313 124,837 
USA 12,881 183 979 11,828 2,288 50 0 28,209 
RUS 15,154 7,448 257 9,607 224 0 3,016 35,706 
VTN 59 0 11 144 2 0 178 394 
APEC 
TOTAL 
385,701 14,764 73,832 42,583 28,426 27,538 45,745 618,590 
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TABLE 10: IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON APEC FISHERIES 
IMPORT VALUE BY CATEGORY (THOUSAND US $) 
 Categories 
 Fish, Fresh, 
Chilled or 
Frozen 
Fish, 
Dried, 
Salted 
or 
Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and 
Mulluscs 
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS 0 0 0 329 0 0 0 329 
BD 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CDA 974 428 6,521 5,343 1,544 300 81 15,191 
CHL 3,277 18 249 9,379 11 114 2 13,050 
PRC 30,783 7,725 3,279 2,122 684 434 14,212 59,240 
HKC 8,764 297 6,457 1,023 1,440 21 58 18,059 
INA 2,080 24 2,401 232 109 828 0 5,674 
JPN 528,035 1,670 324,214 10,782 98,592 1,802 0 965,095 
ROK 68,379 1,216 22,864 1,458 30,012 800 232 124,961 
MAS 0 917 1,830 5,232 1,561 117 0 9,658 
MEX 3,003 386 1,660 6,611 6,531 7,592 690 26,473 
NZ 0 0 456 497 218 29 1,226 2,426 
PNG 545 0 5 10,397 0 0 86 11,033 
PRU 289 38 1 6 21 0 29 383 
RP 15,486 98 975 1,044 1,825 70 451 19,949 
SIN 7,469 62 4,010 149 1,411 1 30 13,133 
CT 9,175 205 41,632 1,117 12,146 520 0 64,795 
THA 85,638 970 20,291 255 1,394 652 4,570 113,770 
USA 45,515 45,515 9,134 33,234 22,773 64 0 111,539 
RUS 9,626 5,812 961 9,488 1,412 0 1,573 28,871 
VTN 125 0 44 208 31 0 70 478 
APEC 
TOTAL 
 
819,162 
 
20,686 
 
446,983 
 
98,906 
 
181,714 
 
13,346 
 
23,310 
 
1,604,108 
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TABLE 11: IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON APEC FISHERIES 
EXPORT VOLUMES BY CATEGORY (METRIC TONS) 
 Categories 
 Fish, 
Fresh, 
Chilled 
or Frozen 
Fish, 
Dried, 
Salted 
or 
Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs  
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS 681 4 989 25 189 10 26 1,924 
BD 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 
CDA 8,034 1,019 2,924 551 622 130 131 13,411  
CHL 6,411 145 379 1,523 720 4,375 11,213 24,766 
PRC 11,277 275 6,547 1,060 2,345  4 61 21,568 
HKC 4,585 236 1,185 489 250 48 126 6,919 
INA 11,847 347 2,663 828 353 4 4 16,068 
JPN 5,699 23 488 508 413 87 204 7,422 
ROK 7,831 38 2,253 1,310 1,175 73 241 12,922 
MAS 2,189 22 2,400 378 672 0 44 5,705 
MEX 2,890  23 1,403 144 635 2 89 5,185 
NZ 6,620 21 2,608 159 130 51 197 9,786 
PNG 84 0 29 0 0 0 0 113 
PRU 678 8 299 357 21 5,986 19,505 26,854 
RP 1,474 11 836 1,243 134 0 3 3,702 
SIN 3,907 49 736 71 245 3 66 5,077 
CT 26,869 25 1,637 214 41 10 160 28,955  
THA 11,187 390 5,971 9,063 6,390  3 24 33,029 
USA 24,224 437 3,086 1,774 953 3,431 881 34,786  
RUS 38,762 1,241 1,178 143 239 127 323 42,013  
VTN 473 29 1,483 17 461 0 13 2,476  
APEC 
TOTAL 
175,722 4,342 39,093  19,862 15,988 14,345 33,332 302,685  
ROW 209,979  10,422  34,739 22,721  12,438 13,193  12,413 315,905  
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TABLE 12: IMPACT OF ELIMINATION OF TARIFFS ON APEC FISHERIES 
EXPORT VALUE BY CATEGORY (THOUSAND US $) 
 Categories 
 Fish, 
Fresh, 
Chilled 
or Frozen 
Fish, 
Dried, 
Salted or 
Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs  
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS 1,446 6 5,986 58 1,207 5 13 8,722 
BD 0 0 2 10 0 0 0 13 
CDA 17,063 1,428 17,701 1,279 3,975 63 67 41,576 
CHL 13,616 204 2,296 3,538 4,603 2,120 5,714 32,091 
PRC 23,951 385 39,635 2,461 14,988 2 31 81,453 
HKC 9,738 330 7,174 1,136 1,599 23 64 20,066 
INA 25,160 486 16,124 1,924 2,259 2 13 45,968 
JPN 12,103 32 2,956 1,180 2,638 42 104 19,055 
ROK 16,631 53 13,639 3,043 7,514 36 123 41,040 
MAS 4,649 31 14,530 877 4,294 0 22 24,403 
MEX 6,137 32 8,493 335 4,058 1 45 19,100 
NZ 14,060 30 15,787 369 829 25 100 31,200 
PNG 178 0 175 0 0 0 0 353 
PRU 1,440 11 1,809 830 136 2,901 9,939 17,067 
RP 3,131 15 5,058 2,886 859 0 2 11,952 
SIN 8,299 68 4,456 166 1,568 1 33 14,592 
CT 57,064 34 9,908 497 264 5 82 67,853 
THA 23,760 547 36,148 21,050 40,851 2 12 122,369 
USA 51,447 613 18,684 4,119 6,092 1,663 449 83,068 
RUS 82,324 1,739 7,131 332 1,525 61 165 93,277 
VTN 1,005 41 8,979 40 2,946 0 6 13,017 
APEC 
TOTAL 
373,203 6,084 236,673 46,132 102,204 6,952 16,985 788,234 
ROW 445,959 14,602 210,310 52,773 79,510 6,394 6,325 815,874 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
On the basis of our analysis, it can be concluded that the economic impact of the removal of 
tariffs on fish and fish products in the APEC region would be significant, but modest. It is 
estimated that, in value terms, the long run increase in imports in the region, arising from the 
elimination of tariffs, would be less than 5 per cent of the 1995 level in value. The 
corresponding increase in exports would be equal to slightly less than 3 per cent of the 1995 
level. 
 
While there is no denying that adjustments would definitely have to be made in industries, 
within the region, competing with imports, it is clear that the entire APEC region would enjoy 
economic benefits from the removal of the tariffs. Moreover, the arguments that the removal of 
tariffs would undermine attempts to improve resource management throughout the region are 
not credible. On the contrary, with comparative advantage shifting in favour of those producers 
having well managed fisheries, free trade and sound resource management are mutually 
supportive. 
 
It should also be stressed that the economic impact of the removal of the tariffs, modest though 
it may be, will be significant for the entire world. This is a reflection of the dominant role, 
which the AEPC members collectively play in world fisheries. Consequently, the example set 
by APEC, in the elimination of tariffs, could lead to pressure for the removal of tariffs on fish 
and fish products in the non-APEC regions of the world, for example the European Union. 
Such a “multiplier” effect could only serve to enhance the long run economic benefits to the 
region arising from the removal of tariffs. 
 
It is our considered opinion that those NTMs, which act as barriers to trade, probably have a 
greater distorting impact upon trade flows in fish and fish products in the region, than do 
tariffs. As a consequence, it is worth cautioning that, while the removal of tariffs would 
produce region wide economic benefits, these benefits could easily be lost through an 
unchecked spread of NTMs.  
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APPENDIX A    
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR IMPORT DEMAND EQUATIONS FOR 
FISH AND FISH PRODUCTS 
 
THE SPECIFICATION OF THE IMPORT DEMAND EQUATION 
 
In order to obtain estimates of the elasticity of import demand of fish and fish products with 
respect to their price, import demand equations with the following specification were estimated 
over the 1980 to 1995 period for which data is available from the FAO. 
 
 
log(mij) = "ij + 0i j · log (pmi j·ei ÷pi) + (i j· log (ci÷(ei ·pi)) 
     
where  mi j is imports of economy i of product category j in metric tonnes; 
 pmi j is the price per tonne of imports of economy i of product category j in U.S. dollars; 
 ei is the exchange rate of the currency of county i with respect to the U.S. dollar; 
 pi is the consumer price index of economy i; and  
 ci  is nominal consumer expenditures in the national currency. 
 
A variant of this specification substitutes real GDP in 1990 U.S. dollars for consumer 
expenditures as the activity variable for some of the economies where consumer expenditures is 
not available. 
 
The crucial coefficient in this specification is  0, the price elasticity of import demand. 
According to the theory of demand, it should be negative. The interpretation of this coefficient 
is complicated in an import demand equation because its impact reflects the net response of 
domestic demand and supply. This coefficient can be used to estimate the impact on imports of 
eliminating the tariff on fish and fish products as it measures the net response of domestic 
demand to a reduction in price facing domestic consumers such as would occur if the tariff 
were eliminated.  
 
The coefficient, (, is the income elasticity of demand. It should usually be positive, but could be 
negative in the case of an inferior good. 
 
THE ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR IMPORT DEMAND EQUATIONS 
 
The results of estimating the basic specification for total fish and fish products by economy 
using ordinary least squares is shown tables A1 and A2. Twenty of the APEC economies are 
included. As Vietnam only imported fish and fish products in four years over the 1980 to 1995 
period, it was not possible to estimate an import demand function for that economy 
 
Of the 20 economies for which import demand equations were estimated, seventeen had the 
correct sign on the relative price variable, and nine of these were statistically significant with a 
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t-statistic value on the coefficient greater than 2. Only three economies had the wrong sign on 
the relative price variable. 
 
The results of estimating the basic specification for the various categories of  fish and fish 
product imports by economy is shown in tables A3 to A12. The seven categories taken from the 
Yearbook: Fisheries Statistics, Commodities published by the FAO are:  
 
1. Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen; 
 
1. Fish, dried, salted or smoked; 
 
1. Crustaceans and Molluscs; 
 
1. Fish canned; 
 
1. Crustaceans and Molluscs, canned; 
 
1. Oils; and 
 
1. Meals. 
 
The estimation results for the more detailed import categories are as satisfactory as the overall 
results. The price elasticities have the correct sign in 109 of the estimates and 73 of these are 
significant by the criterion of a t-statistic greater than 2. In only 28 of the estimates do the price 
elasticities have the wrong sign.  
 
For the categories where the estimated price elasticities from the regressions had the wrong 
sign, a judgmental estimation approach was followed. Under this approach, price elasticities 
were calibrated for the individual product categories as an average of the price elasticities of 
similar economies for which econometric elasticity estimates were available.. For this purpose, 
the economies were grouped into four groups: group 1 is Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and 
the United States; group 2 is China, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, and Chinese Taipei; group 3 is 
the ASEAN economies; and group 4 is Chile, Mexico and Peru. Russia was treated separately. 
The price elasticities by product category for Russia were calibrated at the average of all the 
economies for which estimates were available. Table A13 shows the price elasticities calibrated 
by this judgmental approach as well as the econometric estimates. 
 
Table A13 also summarizes the econometric estimates for the price elasticities by category. For 
purposes of this average, calibrated elasticities are excluded. The average elasticities for the 
various categories ranges between 0.88 for meals to 1.84 for Oils. The average elasticity for the 
 
56 
total category is 0.90. The elasticities for the various economies vary significantly within a 
category and the elasticities for the various categories vary significantly across economies. 
TABLE A1: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real 
Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Obs. 
AUS 14.17822    
(45.54) 
-1.527856   
(-9.58) 
-0.728912    
(-3.03) 
0.860 2.13 16 
BD* 23.22935     
(0.78) 
-0.304166   
(-0.73) 
-1.810329    
(-0.50) 
-0.220 1.72 9 
CDA 15.09153    
(19.23121) 
-2.058418   
(-7.96) 
0.047605     
(0.11) 
0.900 0.88 16 
CHL 26.11573     
(5.37) 
-3.119135  
(-3.82) 
-0.848687    
(-1.95) 
0.462 0.70 16 
PRC* -2.177427    
(0.67) 
-0.115159 
(-0.17) 
2.042267    
(5.74) 
0.886 2.29 12 
HKC* -1.125408    
(-0.43) 
-0.329347  
(-1.41) 
1.293525    
(6.72) 
0.930 0.90 11 
INA 13.84184     
(1.85) 
-0.404905 
(-0.36) 
-0.257132    
(-0.27) 
-0.140 0.45 16 
JPN 18.04255    
(5.51) 
-0.744883 
(-1.79) 
0.485153    
(2.21) 
0.962 1.02 16 
ROK 20.90178     
(6.18) 
-1.296517  
(-2.61) 
2.219190    
(8.61) 
0.831 0.90 16 
MAS 12.26636    
(5.47) 
0.641529    
(1.13) 
-0.057665    
(-0.12) 
0.257 0.79 16 
MEX 13.68888     
(11.76) 
-1.594880  
(-2.63) 
-0.188440    
(-1.54) 
0.373 0.99 16 
NZ 11.51207     
(11.32) 
-1.170984  
(-17.97) 
-0.037697    
(-0.21) 
0.957 2.11 16 
PNG 8.045913     
(5.57) 
-1.032581  
(-1.48) 
0.757231    
(1.63) 
0.146 0.52 16 
* Indicates Real GDP used as activity variable instead of Consumer Expenditures. 
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TABLE A2: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TOTAL FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real 
Consumer 
Expenditures 
or GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
PRU 10.87373    
(2.30) 
-0.077914   
(-1.21) 
-0.208745    
(-0.80) 
0.119 2.28 15 
RP 10.21098     
(2.27) 
-0.010450  
(-0.01) 
-1.318873    
(-0.96) 
0.076 0.69 16 
SIN 11.18850     
(84.29) 
0.167049    
(1.48) 
0.158200    
(3.62) 
0.814 3.11 16 
CT* 14.59412     
(13.04) 
-1.303968  
(-5.22) 
0.369978    
(5.53) 
0.937 1.04 15 
THA 11.28471     
(14.13) 
1.227071    
(5.41) 
3.243194    
(11.24) 
0.913 1.17 16 
USA 11.89946    
(20.22) 
-0.790143   
(-3.20) 
0.928796    
(7.78) 
0.840 1.01 16 
RUS 14.27999    
(25.02) 
-0.808623   
(-3.66) 
-0.277718    
(-2.56) 
0.706 2.88 11 
VTN NA NA NA NA NA NA 
* Indicates Real GDP used as activity variable instead of Consumer Expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
 
TABLE A3: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
AUS1 12.31924  
(30.24) 
-1.254718  
(-4.47) 
-0.493347    
(-1.80) 
0.547 1.30 16 
AUS2 9.849448 
(47.66) 
-0.227212     
(-8.24) 
-0.741894    
(-2.73) 
0.838    1.48 16  
AUS3 15.58932   
(14.64) 
-2.466986  
(-6.09) 
-1.603765     
(-2.38) 
0.702    1.77    16  
AUS4 11.15563     
(20.79) 
-0.620276    
(-2.22) 
0.005725    
( 0.02) 
0.193 2.20 16  
AUS5 11.69448     
(12.98)  
-1.050336   
(-2.59)   
-1.176887    
(-2.55)   
0.402     1.45 16  
AUS6 7.023932  
(15.48) 
-1.643188    
(-2.68)   
0.238182      
(0.26) 
0.344    1.37  12  
AUS7 7.277455     
(11.75) 
-2.362209   
(-4.56) 
2.477803     (2.58) 0.598 2.08 16  
BD1* 
 
64.19318     
(1.78) 
-1.114100  
(-3.06) 
-6.877577   
(-1.58) 
0.503     1.97 9 
BD2* 
 
38.47169  
(1.28) 
0.407146    
(0.59) 
-4.060702    
(-1.14) 
0.280     0.10     9 
BD3* 
 
12.42954  
(0.41)   
-0.290460   
(-0.59)  
-0.698241    
(-0.19)  
-0.226 2.24     9 
BD4* 
 
42.04948  
(1.95) 
1.683802   
(2.01) 
-4.624870   
(-1.80) 
0.678 1.03 9  
BD5* 
 
95.84362  
(3.15) 
-0.375803  
(-0.32)  
-10.97803   
(-2.96) 
0.461     1.53 9 
BD6* 
 
99.64216  
(0.66) 
-5.039327 
(-2.89)  
-11.60259   
(-0.63) 
0.758     1.39 5                       
BD7* 
 
-12.22404   
(-0.27) 
-0.969589 
(-1.68)  
2.252998     (0.40) 0.531 2.24     5                       
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TABLE A4: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures or 
real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
CDA1 12.28420     
(14.65) 
-2.792668   
(-4.13)  
1.940798     
(3.75) 
0.610 0.71 16  
CDA2 8.224803  
(9.30) 
-3.171773 
(-5.95) 
4.494648    
(4.94) 
0.715 1.45     16  
CDA3 15.07054    
(12.94) 
-1.836222 
(-5.95) 
-0.574586  (-1.17) 0.845     0.99 16  
CDA4 9.522052  
(8.85) 
-0.772069 
(-2.37) 
1.797380     
(2.81) 
0.724 0.83     16  
CDA5 8.710200  
(11.23) 
-0.754461 
(-2.50) 
1.906199     (4.66) 0.661    1.10    16  
CDA6 2.650713  
(0.86) 
-0.743712   
(-2.41)  
5.568163     
(2.14) 
0.706    0.54     16  
CDA7 -2.013782   
(-0.39) 
-0.257431 
(-0.15)  
10.27281     
(2.58) 
0.526     0.83     16  
CHL1 0.736447 
(0.68) 
0.369530 
(2.39) 
-3.432867   
(-23.58) 
0.994 2.08     8                       
CHL2 15.30956  
(4.25) 
-1.829779 
(-3.73)  
-0.150583   (-0.51) 0.756    3.62     6                       
CHL3 10.77803     
(7.27) 
-0.952235 
(-5.03) 
-1.309852  (-8.28) 0.996 2.19 6                       
CHL4 36.97027  
(3.86) 
-5.036522 
(-3.05) 
-2.017095  
(-2.47)  
0.346     0.70     16  
CHL5 12.08409  
(6.30) 
-1.308920 
(-4.55)  
-0.075326  
(-0.62) 
0.791    1.88 6                       
CHL6 -14.87994   
(-4.51) 
2.784708 
(5.47) 
-6.400477    (-9.98) 0.988   3.28    7                       
CHL7 NA NA NA NA    NA NA                         
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TABLE A5: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
PRC1* 
 
-12.33541   
(-4.11) 
-0.337654 
(-0.69)  
3.206574    
(7.82) 
0.948 1.95     12                      
PRC2* 
 
2.272244     
(0.37) 
-0.941171 
(-1.57)  
1.087039   
(1.23) 
0.047     1.12 12  
PRC3* 
 
-13.32626   
(-5.47) 
-0.070770 
(-0.20) 
3.066948   (10.24) 0.908 0.87     12  
PRC4* 
 
-21.88760   
(-4.32) 
-0.909541  
(-2.34)  
3.852911   
(5.98) 
0.844     1.62    9 
PRC5* 
 
-25.71780   
(0.92) 
-0.960935 
(-0.90) 
4.312842    
(1.26) 
0.831     1.78 9 
PRC6* 
 
-13.84545  
(-5.43) 
-0.353075 
(-1.97) 
2.801540    
(8.35) 
0.895    2.16 9 
PRC7* 
 
3.747752    
(1.38) 
1.031454 
(1.65) 
1.194111    
(3.31) 
0.767 2.86 12 
HKC1* 
 
3.812412    
(2.09) 
-0.995723 
(-9.05) 
0.879503     (6.03) 0.987 1.78    11 
HKC2* 
 
-0.338393  
(-0.16) 
-0.562422  
(-2.62)  
1.054415   
(4.35) 
0.646    2.02   11 
HKC3* 
 
-7.194908   
(-1.15) 
0.574518  
(0.88) 
1.519192  
(3.74) 
0.740 0.65     11 
HKC4* 
 
-9.315154  
(-3.73) 
-0.645580 
(-1.89)  
1.779471     
(10.70) 
0.970 2.04 11 
HKC5* 
 
-15.73358  
(-1.99) 
0.942621 
(1.04) 
1.827691     
(4.59) 
0.936 1.80    11 
HKC6* 
 
-26.53803 
(-1.64) 
-6.463267 
(-4.40)  
3.599875    
(2.50) 
0.744    2.63     9 
HKC7* 
 
8.243550    
(0.93) 
0.017098  
(0.02) 
0.160062     (0.21) -0.242 0.77     11 
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TABLE A6: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
INA1 3.678977   
(2.28) 
0.845279  
(3.16) 
2.829538     (3.77) 0.452 1.99 16 
INA2 11.54136  
(5.95) 
-0.987518 
(-3.88) 
-1.109115   
(-1.07)   
0.814    1.35   16 
INA3 23.92036   
(4.51) 
-2.338896  
(-3.66) 
-3.371348    
(-2.38)  
0.472 0.83     16 
INA4 6.574535    
(1.48) 
0.071034 
(0.12) 
1.356402   
(1.46) 
0.138    1.75 16 
INA5 14.17043    
(6.19) 
-1.150141 
(-4.34)  
0.837162   
(1.44) 
0.533 1.75    16 
INA6 18.35907  
(2.11) 
-1.744077 
(-1.46) 
-3.689670  (-2.06) 0.738     0.67     16 
INA7 14.25822   
(2.15) 
-0.487899 
(-0.48) 
-0.069346  (-0.08) -0.127 0.53 16 
JPN1 22.75238    
(4.15) 
-1.567340 
(-2.12) 
0.301579    
(0.87) 
0.914    1.01    16 
JPN2 10.43476  
(4.89) 
-0.036908 
(-0.15)  
-0.010487   
(-0.09) 
-0.151 1.67    16 
JPN3 17.12328     
(8.44) 
-0.652500  
(-2.52) 
0.271016    
(2.74) 
0.943 0.8    16 
JPN4 8.287129   
(2.20) 
-0.080392  
(-0.17)  
1.174693     (8.36) 0.950 0.81    16 
JPN5 3.620107   
(1.50) 
0.612757 
(1.69) 
1.082928   (14.66) 0.940     0.95 16 
JPN6 13.79257    
(8.71) 
-0.990708  
(-5.74)  
0.332866    
(1.18) 
0.821    1.03    16 
JPN7 4.047917    
(0.89) 
0.679158 
(0.96) 
1.880428    
(3.55) 
0.866 1.83     16 
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TABLE A7: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
ROK1 19.11337  
(5.71) 
-1.084536 
(-2.20)  
2.046425    
(6.77) 
0.752 0.86    16 
ROK2 17.82612   
(7.00) 
-1.515440 
(-4.95) 
0.567030     (0.81) 0.636    0.69    16 
ROK3 15.51585    
(5.35) 
-0.770251 
(-1.92) 
2.456607     (8.71) 0.834    1.42    16 
ROK4 17.87682   
(4.82) 
-1.568526 
(-3.56) 
2.048837     (3.70) 0.683 0.97 16 
ROK5 23.78389    
(2.50) 
-2.119943 
(-1.84) 
3.556690      
(3.86) 
0.716     0.94 16 
ROK6 20.70755     
(8.06) 
-1.950836  
(-4.59) 
2.446118     
(5.77) 
0.767 1.15 16 
ROK7 10.29449   
(0.84) 
-0.183809 
(-0.09) 
3.374836     (3.22) 0.509    0.98 16 
MAS1 18.62532  
(5.89) 
2.133136  
(4.27) 
-1.419864  (-2.29)  0.723 1.49 16 
MAS2 4.410038   
(2.36) 
-0.875943 
(-3.02) 
0.964655   
(2.83) 
0.568 1.53    16 
MAS3 5.698710   
(4.60) 
-0.275536 
(-1.48) 
0.910712     
(3.54) 
0.584    1.33 16 
MAS4 14.63691   
(11.27) 
-1.198029 
(-2.38) 
-0.651776  (-2.29) 0.587 1.31     16 
MAS5 9.838523 
(4.32) 
0.080551 
(0.20) 
-0.250143   
(-0.60) 
-0.121 1.24     16 
MAS6 -7.136878   
(-2.06) 
-0.746101 
(-0.93) 
2.554657     (3.85) 0.477   1.25    15 
MAS7 18.85306  
(8.92) 
0.492415 
(1.14) 
-1.584496    
(-4.01) 
0.501    0.74 16 
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TABLE A8: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
MEX1 11.67566    
(8.18) 
-1.398185 
(-2.14)  
-0.153581   
(-1.19) 
0.283  0.86 16 
MEX2 14.29780     
(5.54) 
-0.314790 
(-0.55) 
-0.924826   
(-4.87)  
0.602   0.62 16 
MEX3 12.06267   
(9.39) 
-0.818093 
(-2.31) 
-0.372564  (-2.66) 0.497   1.44  16 
MEX4 19.93847 
(4.56) 
-4.470391 
(-2.70) 
-0.386919  
(-1.39) 
0.327 1.94 16 
MEX5 23.07907   
(3.41) 
-5.282497 
(-2.03) 
-0.382745   
(-1.38) 
0.291 1.54 15 
MEX6 10.40965    
(6.80) 
-3.237766 
(-4.86) 
-0.153611   
(-0.85) 
0.769 0.92 16 
MEX7 10.48159    
(8.08) 
0.036120   
(0.04) 
-0.072237   
(-0.47) 
-0.132 1.12   16 
NZ1 -18.04232  
(-1.34) 
-1.823219  
(-6.02) 
4.826657     
(1.96) 
0.753 0.72 16 
NZ2 3.922454   
(0.57) 
-2.993303  
(-6.07) 
1.190318     (0.90) 0.736 1.38  16 
NZ3 12.20698     
(4.31) 
-2.067583  
(-9.75) 
-0.064757   
(-0.14)  
0.865 2.90     16 
NZ4 13.62676  
(12.72) 
-0.94301  
(-9.45) 
-0.593407    
(-3.00)   
0.894 1.89     16 
NZ5 6.166409    
(2.92) 
0.407088 
(1.86) 
-0.049642   
(-0.13) 
0.089 1.47 16 
NZ6 -2.860434  
(-0.51) 
-1.364388 
(-4.22) 
1.612552    
(1.65) 
0.744 1.39 11 
NZ7 7.305021   
(0.80) 
-2.249475 
(-2.81)  
0.194245    
(0.12) 
0.512    1.46 8 
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TABLE A9: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
PNG1 11.46358    
(3.23) 
-0.481314  
(-0.87)  
-1.426188   
(-1.25)  
0.032  0.52 16 
PNG2 -4.512313   
(-0.41) 
-1.057429 
(-2.36) 
2.754966    
(0.77) 
0.209 0.62     15 
PNG3 -6.046618   
(-0.77) 
-0.549776   
(-1.54)  
3.437517     
(1.38) 
0.158 0.7 16 
PNG4 8.091182     
(4.98) 
-1.882678 
(-3.14) 
0.763614     (1.48) 0.44 0.93 16 
PNG5 1.064053     
(0.15) 
-2.309950 
(-4.37)  
1.798347   
(0.88) 
0.771 1.77    13 
PNG6 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
PNG7 10.08293     
(2.44) 
-0.941542 
(-1.05)  
-1.134720   
(-0.91) 
0.08   0.99    11 
PRU1 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
PRU2 -1.750325   
(-0.60) 
0.011473   
(0.29) 
0.236046     (1.43) 0.066   1.03 12 
PRU3 -6.273731   
(-2.43) 
-0.068216 
(-1.76) 
0.542598     (3.78) 0.559     1.93 11 
PRU4 3.669868     
(0.59) 
-0.025747 
(-0.43) 
0.064539    
(0.18) 
-0.178 1.49     13 
PRU5 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
PRU6 0.560509   
(0.05) 
-0.446201  
(-2.58) 
0.043729     
(0.07) 
0.358    1.8 12 
PRU7 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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TABLE A10: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
RP1 8.772964    
(4.76) 
-1.625406  
(-3.86) 
-4.977758   
(-4.52) 
0.852 0.83 16 
RP2 9.465649     
(3.12) 
-1.383361 
(-2.64)  
-0.353691    
(-0.66) 
0.530 1.65     16 
RP3 12.21907    
(10.86) 
-1.638060 
(-11.20)  
0.594361     
(0.96) 
0.920 1.62 16 
RP4 20.66610     
(14.40) 
-2.935846  
(-7.27)   
3.803727     (5.80) 0.885 1.68  16 
RP5 23.52337    
(5.40) 
-4.810415 
(-3.90) 
1.369282    
(1.54) 
0.468 1.67   16 
RP6 11.96971    
(2.57) 
-2.649545 
(-2.03)  
-1.419872   
(-1.44) 
0.501 0.42  16 
RP7 10.12633    
(5.29) 
-0.253842  
(-0.32) 
-1.081226    
(-1.88) 
0.100 0.89 16 
SIN1 8.759797     
(26.15) 
0.177457  
(0.70) 
0.517389    
(6.76) 
0.808 1.79 16 
SIN2 9.020453  
(30.75) 
-0.739124 
(-6.36)   
0.247418    
(2.71) 
0.768 1.50 16 
SIN3 8.099242  
(12.92) 
0.190666 
(0.50) 
0.468848    
(3.01) 
0.505 0.68     16 
SIN4 11.33612    
(13.03) 
-1.966980 
(-2.85) 
0.108010   
(0.73) 
0.305 0.51  16 
SIN5 6.800230    
(16.76) 
-0.593386 
(-4.64) 
0.559992   (11.95) 0.909 2.00     16 
SIN6 7.476021     
(9.48) 
-1.160548 
(-3.47)  
-0.068861   
(-0.44) 
0.413  1.47 16 
SIN7 15.86137    
(25.93) 
0.476587 
(1.24) 
-1.156613   
(-8.64) 
0.932 2.11   16 
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TABLE A11: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
CT1 2.041987     
(1.04) 
-0.286608 
(-1.87) 
1.407575    
(7.14) 
0.989 1.71 15 
CT2 -2.613976   
(-0.34) 
-0.380304 
(-0.38) 
1.555774     
(2.22) 
0.264 0.72 15 
CT3 7.435090    
(4.90) 
-1.154625 
(-6.51)  
1.128072     
(9.00) 
0.970    1.52 15 
CT4 0.252659    
(0.05) 
-0.310211  
(-0.35)  
1.393699    
(4.94) 
0.925 1.26 15 
CT5 -4.622321   
(-1.43) 
0.467832 
(0.91) 
1.590456   (11.57) 0.941 0.86    15 
CT6 12.06269    
(3.56) 
-1.473542 
(-3.27) 
0.027294     
(0.12) 
0.541 1.05 11 
CT7 12.77999    
(5.94) 
-0.657816 
(-1.60) 
0.277779    
(1.56) 
0.738 0.52 15 
THA1* 15.09011   
(12.91) 
-0.810774 
(1.65) 
1.886779     
(2.64) 
0.724 0.61 16 
THA2 11.12728    
(15.78) 
-1.317400 
(-5.95) 
-1.275778   
(-1.89) 
0.775 0.89  16 
THA3 13.21881  
(14.44) 
-0.297705 
(-1.25) 
2.222229     (7.06) 0.877 1.72   16 
THA4 14.20938     
(3.97) 
-1.728358 
(-2.36) 
1.479670    
(1.20) 
0.219 0.59 16 
THA5 11.40608    
(18.07) 
-0.540681 
(-3.45)   
1.185733     
(4.03) 
0.490     2.39 16 
THA6 14.85584    
(10.07) 
-1.070680 
(-1.89) 
6.124271     
(7.48) 
0.890 0.34 13 
THA7 17.04870    
(6.02) 
0.491803   
(0.45) 
12.66058    
(8.45) 
0.871 1.11   15 
* Imports of fresh, chilled or frozen tuna were excluded from both the left and right hand side of the equation 
because tuna imports were primarily brought in to provide the raw material for canned tuna exports and were 
thus not sensitive to relative import prices. 
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TABLE A12: REGRESSION RESULTS FOR SEVEN CATEGORIES OF  
FISHERIES IMPORTS  
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Volume of Fisheries Imports (metric tons) 
Economy/ 
Category 
Intercept Relative 
Price 
Logarithm of 
Real Consumer 
Expenditures 
or real GDP* 
(US $ ) 
Adj. 
R2 
D.W. Number of 
Observations 
USA1 13.21967   
(24.50) 
0.277231   
(0.87) 
-0.023744   
(-0.12) 
-0.049 1.41 16 
USA2 10.12818   
(24.47) 
-0.263773 
(-1.70) 
0.143502     (1.07) 0.059 1.97 16 
USA3 5.635125   
(4.12) 
-0.312602 
(-1.63) 
2.110532     (7.82) 0.975 1.41 16 
USA4 9.465620    
(3.88)  
-1.175854 
(-2.25) 
1.047693     
(1.89) 
0.798 0.55  16 
USA5 10.91813    
(8.28) 
-1.374958 
(-4.07)   
0.699151     (1.62) 0.497 1.35 16 
USA6 3.329172   
(2.28) 
-0.174753 
(-0.69) 
1.711079     (4.15) 0.545 1.17 16 
USA7 8.934862   
(4.42) 
-2.738711  
(-5.98) 
0.055998    
(0.09) 
0.766 1.42     16 
RUS1* 
 
62.69898   
(3.18) 
-0.544476 
(-4.83) 
-3.655966   
(-2.54) 
0.777 2.18 11 
RUS2* 
 
137.9170    
(4.33)    
-1.121316 
(-6.21)  
-9.267029   
(-4.00) 
0.802 3.13 11 
RUS3* 
 
200.2685    
(4.76) 
-0.622200 
(-2.48) 
-14.13809     
(-4.66) 
0.713 1.73 10 
RUS4* 
 
142.2433    
(6.42) 
-0.808510 
(-3.32)  
-9.628551    
(-6.08) 
0.855 2.03 11 
RUS5* 
 
33.84764   
(0.11) 
-1.359389 
(-0.35)  
-1.510840    
(-0.06) 
0.623 2.15 4 
RUS6* 
 
69.47630     
(7.11E+36) 
1.565250  
(1.60E+37)    
-5.061058     
(-7.21E+36) 
1.000 2.93      3 
RUS7* 
 
151.2446   
(1.73) 
-1.046774 
(-2.00) 
-10.30980    
(-1.62) 
0.167 1.62 11 
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TABLE A13: ESTIMATED IMPORT PRICE ELASTICITIES BY CATEGORY 
Economy  Categories 
 Fish, 
Fresh, 
Chilled 
or 
Frozen 
Fish, 
Dried, 
Salted or 
Smoked 
Crustaceans 
and 
Mulluscs 
Fish, 
Canned 
Crustaceans 
and 
Mulluscs, 
Canned 
Oils  Meals  Total 
AUS 1.25* 0.23* 2.47* 0.62* 1.05* 1.64* 2.36* 1.53* 
BD 1.11* 1.06c 0.29 1.94c 0.38 5.04* 0.97 0.30 
CDA 2.79* 3.17* 1.84* 0.77* 0.75* 0.74* 0.26 2.06* 
CHL 1.40c 1.83* 0.95* 5.04* 1.31* 1.85c 0.64c 3.12* 
PRC 0.34 0.94 0.07 0.91* 0.96 0.35 0.42c 0.12 
HKC 1.00* 0.56* 0.66c 0.65 1.54c 6.46* 0.42c 0.33 
INA 1.07c 0.99* 2.34* 1.94c 1.15* 1.74 0.49 0.40 
JPN 1.57* 0.04 0.65* 0.08 1.54c 0.99* 0.42c 0.74 
ROK 1.08* 1.52* 0.77 1.57* 2.12 1.95* 0.18 1.30* 
MAS 1.07c 0.88* 0.28 1.20* 1.63c 0.75 0.66c 0.44c 
MEX 1.40* 0.31 0.82* 4.47* 5.28* 3.24* 0.64c 1.59* 
NZ 1.82* 2.99* 2.07* 0.94* 1.06c 1.36* 2.25* 1.17* 
PNG 0.48 1.06* 0.55 1.88* 2.31* 2.07c 0.94 1.03 
PRU 1.40c 1.07c 0.07 0.03 3.30c 0.45* 0.64c 0.08 
RP 1.63* 1.38* 1.64* 2.94* 4.81* 2.65* 0.25 0.01 
SIN 1.07c 0.74* 0.90c 1.97* 0.59* 1.16* 0.66 0.44 
CT 0.29 0.38 1.15* 0.31 1.54c 1.47* 0.66 1.30* 
THA 0.81d 1.32* 0.30 1.73* 0.54* 1.07 0.66c 0.44c 
USA 1.95c 0.26 0.31 1.18* 1.38* 0.17 2.74* 0.79* 
RUS 0.54* 1.12* 0.62* 0.81* 1.36 1.84c 1.05* 0.81* 
VTN 1.07c 1.06c 0.90c 1.94c 1.63c 2.07c 0.66c 0.44c 
Average ex. 
calibrated 
1.21 1.09  0.94 1.55  1.65 1.84 0.88 0.90 
Correct 
Sign 
13 18 18 18 14 17 11 17 
Of which 
Significant 
10 13 10 14 10 12 4 9 
Wrong 
Sign 
6 2 2 2 5 3 8 3 
* indicates that the elasticity is significant using a t-statistic greater than 2 as criterion. 
c indicates that the elasticity was calibrated based on the elasticity of similar economies as described in this 
appendix. 
d indicates that the import price elasticity Thailand is for imports excluding tuna. 
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APPENDIX B 
STRUCTURE OF APEC FISHERIES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
SIMULATION MODEL 
 
The structure of the APEC Fisheries Trade Liberalization Simulation Model is very 
straightforward and simple. It contains equations for imports of fish and fish products in 
volume and value for each of the APEC member economies and equations for the volume and 
value of exports for each APEC member economy and the Rest of the World. 
 
IMPORTS 
 
The change in real imports of the various categories of fish and fish products for an economy 
are, in general, equal to the tariff rate for the category divided by one plus the tariff rate times 
the price elasticity of the category times real imports of the category.  The tariff rate is divided 
by one plus the tariff rate to calculate the percentage reduc tion in price resulting from the 
elimination of the tariff. 
 
 
where  )mij is increase in imports of economy i of product category j in metric tonnes; 
Ji j is the average tariff on product j in economy i; 
0i j is the price elasticity of import demand for product j in economy i; 
 mij is imports of economy i of product category j in metric tonnes; 
 
An exception to the general rule is the economies of Hong Kong and Singapore. In this case, 
imports by product category are determined by exports of product category : 
 
 
The import price deflators for Hong Kong and Sinagpore are equal to 90 per cent of the export 
price deflator to allow an appropriate margin on reexports. 
 
 
Another exception to the general rule is for Thailand. In this case, imports of fresh tuna is 
excluded from category 1when the change due to the elimination of the tariff is calculated and 
another component representing the demand for fresh tuna imports to meet the demand for 
canned tuna exports is included (the 1.77 coefficient represents the weight ratio between fresh 
and canned tuna).. 
 
Dm mij ij ij ij ij= + × ×( / ( ))t t h1
D Dm xij ij=
pm pxij ij= ×.9
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The total impact on imports in metric tonnes for economy i is calculated by summing over the 
impact by category for economy i. 
 
 
The impact on category j in U.S. dollars for economy i is calculated by multiplying the impact 
in tonnes by the price per tonne of imports. 
 
   
The total impact in U.S. dollars is also calculated by summing over the categories. 
 
 
 
The total impact on imports in metric tonnes for the APEC region is calculated by summing the 
total real impact over the 21 member economies. 
 
 
The total impact on the value of imports for the APEC region is calculated by summing the 
total impact in U.S. dollars over the 21 member economies. 
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EXPORTS 
 
The change in real exports of the various categories of fish and fish products for an economy k 
including the rest of the world as well as the 21 APEC member economies are equal to: 
 
 
where  )xkj is increase in imports of economy k of product category j in metric tonnes; 
Tij is the share of economy k in world imports of  product. 
 
The total impact on exports in metric tonnes for economy i is calculated by summing over the 
impact by category for economy k. 
 
 
The impact on exports of category j in U.S. dollars for economy k is calculated by multiplying 
the impact in tonnes by the APEC average price per tonne of exports of category j. 
 
 
The APEC average price per tonne of exports is calculated by dividing the impact on nominal 
imports of category j by the impact on real imports of category j. 
  
  
The total impact on exports in U.S. dollars for economy k is calculated by summing over the 
categories. 
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APPENDIX C 
DATA USED IN APEC  FISHERIES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
SIMULATION MODEL 
 
The data used in the APEC Fisheries Trade Liberalization Model fall into three groups: 
fisheries trade; tariffs; and economic. 
 
FISHERIES TRADE 
 
The fisheries trade data used are those provided by the Food and Agricultural Organization of 
the United Nations  on annual exports and imports of fishery products by economy.  In terms of 
product types, data are reported for seven commodity groups as follows: 
 
- FISH, fresh, chilled or frozen 
- FISH, dried, salted or smoked 
- CRUSTACEANS and MOLLUSCS 
- FISH, canned 
- CRUSTACEANS and MOLLUSCS, canned 
- OILS 
- MEALS 
 
Traded quantities and values are reported in metric tonnes and US dollars.  The special 
tabulation of FAO data for APEC economies covers the period 1980 through to 1995, the latest 
year of the publication of the Yearbook: Fishery Statistics, Commodities. 
 
Details appear in two separate sections: by quantity and value.  Each section shows the 
economies in alphabetical order.  Economy totals of imports and exports are highlighted in the 
top two lines, followed by the seven commodity details of imports and exports. 
 
Summaries are provided for the APEC community and the world. 
 
FISH AND FISH PRODUCT TARIFFS 
 
Very detailed information (over 100 pages) on the tariffs that apply to the various categories 
fish and fish products for the 21 member economies of APEC was provided by the PEC 
Fisheries Working Group.  Average tariffs for each of the seven FAO categories of fish and 
fish products were calculated by taking a simple average of the tariffs applicable to items 
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falling within the category. A simple average was used because full data was not available on 
the composition of items within the categories. The overall average tariff was calculated by 
weighting the average tariff for the category by the proportion of import value falling within 
the category. 
 
As will be noted, a few member economies have zero tariffs on fish and fish products -- those 
being Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong and Singapore.  
 
ECONOMIC DATA 
 
The economic data on the value of consumer expenditures, consumer price indexes, exchange 
rates, and GDP were taken, where possible,  from the International Monetary Fund, Financial 
Statistics Yearbook 1997. For Hong Kong,  Chinese Taipei and Vietnam, who are not members 
of the IMF, data had to be taken from United Nations or national sources. 
 
A detailed Phase I report, which was submitted June 10, 1998 and revised July 23, 1978, was 
prepared providing background on the data used in this report. 
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Japan’s Comments on an APEC/FWG Study: 
Free Trade and Investment in the Fisheries Sector of the Asia-Pacific Region: 
An Economic Analysis of Tariffs (Ref: F98/CP/00267) 
 
Fisheries Agency of Japan 
                                                       June 1999 
1 Introduction 
 
This analysis was tasked originally to analyze possible economic impacts of tariffs on fishery 
products in a objective manner. However, in actuality, it has turned out to be a tool to 
unilaterally support and propagate the position for abolition of tariffs, and thus overstepped 
from its original intention. Furthermore, a specific position is maintained with respect to 
impacts of the abolition of tariffs on fishery management, which obviously contradicts the 
instruction from the Fisheries Working Group that an objective analysis should be carried out. 
Therefore, inappropriate portions of the draft text, such as the assertion that tariff elimination 
would support regional economy, should be deleted in order to make the analysis fully 
compatible with the instruction from the Working Group. 
 
2  Liberalization of trade in fishery products, which are exhaustible renewable resources, 
will not lead to benefiting the regional economy. It would be misleading to treat the issue 
of liberalization of fishery product trade in the same way as for industrial products 
because such an approach could disrupt the sustainability of the resources. 
 
(1) The conditions of popula tions of many of the fishery resources now subjected to 
international trade have been deteriorating to a great extent. According to the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), more than 60% of usable fishery 
resources in the world cannot stand any increase in the catch from the present level. 
Consequently, to liberalize trade in fishery products and introduce free competition in fisheries 
would lead to excessive fishery activities, rapidly causing depletion of fishery resources on 
both regional and global levels. This would eventually end up in collapse of regional economy, 
as seen in the case of cod resources in the Atlantic coastal area of Canada. 
 
(2) What is pursued by trade liberalization is the realization of an international division of labor 
in fishery production in accordance with the principle of relative superiority. This will further 
increase the ubiquitous capability to export fishery products (10 countries account for 49% of 
overall seafood exports), further deteriorating the state of fishery resources targeted by those 
countries. It is quite possible for many countries that intensified competition will prompt 
depletion of the resources, leading to decrease in production and shrinkage of exports. 
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(3) Unlike industrial products, foods, which are "resources for survival," should not be 
subjected to international division of labor solely based on the principle of relative superiority. 
In view of anticipated constraints in food supply and subsequent political instability in the 
years ahead, such an approach will put have-nots in an increasingly difficult position to secure 
their food supply. 
 
(4) The international division of labor will accelerate the trend for mono-culture in food 
production, weakening the capability for survival of each nation in the face of changes in 
international situations, natural disasters and changes in environmental conditions. 
 
(5) This analysis, if we understand it correctly, presents a scenario, quite unfair to Japan, that 
the benefit of tariff elimination can be realized at the sacrifice only of Japan. 
 
3 Liberalization of trade in fishery products will adversely affect fishery management (in 
other words, cause increase in the cost for environmental conservation.) 
 
(1) It is misleading to promote trade liberalization conducive to increased catches at a time 
when FAO and other organizations are discussing ways to drastically curtail fishing efforts 
based on the recognition that 60% of the world's fishery resources are harvested excessively. 
 
(2) Investors seeking to evade international fishery regulations are transferring their vessels to 
countries, which are non-members to international organizations, for the reason of convenience, 
and engage in lawless and disorderly operations to produce fishery products at extremely low 
costs, thereby contributing to depletion of the fishery resources. To guarantee an equal access 
for such free-riders and outlaws to consuming market by means of liberalization of trade in 
fishery products is nothing but promoting equality in a very negative sense. Such a measure 
would drive fishermen 
abiding by international rules--such as those in Japan-- from price superiority and cause 
collapse of fishery resources. It is advised, rather, that responsible consuming countries should 
introduce responsible trade policies (including imposition of special levies) and reinforce the 
system for orderly trade and fishery resource management. 
 
(3) Increased investment in management and enforcement by nations with a due sense of 
responsibility, such as Japan, will cause increase in management cost, and subsequently raise 
the prices of fishery products harvested within a legitimate framework. This will push down 
relative prices of fishery products harvested illegally or outside management quota, causing 
expanded demand for the fishery products in question as well as excessive harvesting of the 
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resources. It means that fishery products, in which legitimate management costs are 
incorporated, are exposed to competition from those free of such management costs. For this 
reason, it is a matter of urgency to build up an appropriate and responsible trade system, 
including the current tariff and non-tariff measures, in order to help sound development of the 
activities of law-abiding fishermen and the regional economy on which such fishermen base 
their livelihood. 
 
(4) Some argue that the shift to the principle of relative superiority will lead to better managed 
fisheries, especially expansion of demand for aquaculture products. But cost burdens for 
management are totally ignored in such arguments. Further, not all fish species are cultured, 
especially those species such as tuna, cod and Patagonian toothfish, that are widely traded and 
present concerns in terms of resource conservation. 
 
(5) Abolition of tariffs prove to have detrimental consequences when we consider the costs for 
environmental conservation arising out of excessive fishing and the costs for reinforcing 
management--both of which do not occur or seriously counted in other industry sectors--as well 
as the costs to deal with the problems of the industry affected by increasing imports. 
 
 
